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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joseph Duane Herrera appeals from his conviction for second degree murder entered
following a second jury trial, for the shooting death of his girlfriend.  Previously in this case,
Mr. Herrera was charged with second degree murder and convicted after a three-day jury trial in
2013.  He was sentenced to life, with twenty-two years fixed.  He appealed, and his conviction
was vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2015.  He was retried, and again convicted of second
degree murder in 2016.  This time, a different sentencing judge sentenced him to life, with thirty
years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Herrera asserts that the prosecutor vindictively prosecuted him and misled
the district court when it sought to amend the information to add a firearm sentencing
enhancement and vindictively prosecuted him after trial by arguing for an increased sentence
based on the dismissed sentencing enhancement; the district court erred in failing to provide him
with a full and fair opportunity to explain the conflict he was having with his attorney; the
district court abused its discretion when it overruled his foundation objections to Detective
Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis because Detective Berger did not have practical
experience or special knowledge that would qualify him as an expert on gunshot residue
analysis; and the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments.  The accumulation
of the errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial.  Finally, Mr. Herrera asserts that the second
sentencing judge vindictively increased his sentence by eight years fixed.
Statement of Facts
Midmorning on December 25, 2011, Joseph Herrera’s mother heard a loud bang from the
upstairs of her home.  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.436, L.24 – p.437, L.15.)  When she went upstairs, she
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saw her son Joseph, holding a handgun, and he was screaming hysterically.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.437,
L.16 – p.438, L.1, p.447, Ls.23-25.)  Mr. Herrera told his mom he had accidentally shot his
girlfriend.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.438, Ls.2-4.)  When she saw the injured woman lying on the bedroom
floor, Mrs. Herrera yelled to her husband to call 911, and told her son to bring her some towels.
(Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.438,  Ls.5-23.)   Mrs.  Herrera  sat  with  the  injured  woman  until  the  paramedics
arrived.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.440, Ls.16-20, p.448, Ls.4-8.)
During the time his dad was on the phone with 911, Mr. Herrera took the phone from him
in order to answer the dispatch operator’s questions.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.438, L.21 – p.439, L.9,
p.614, Ls.16-21; Defendant’s Ex. A.)  He also called and spoke to his girlfriend’s family on the
phone.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.614, Ls.6-25.)  When Officer Scott Castles arrived at the house, he saw
Joseph Herrera outside the house, hysterically screaming.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.417, L.16 – p.418,
L.7.)  Mr. Herrera remained at the house, hysterically shrieking and yelling—freaking out—until
well after the ambulance left.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.430, Ls.3-7, p.461, Ls.12-21.)  Soon after the
ambulance left, Mr. Herrera’s girlfriend’s family arrived, armed and threatening Mr. Herrera and
his family.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.459, L.14 – p.460, L.11.)  At that point, Officer Castles told the still
hysterical Mr. Herrera to go, meaning away from the risk posed by the armed family members.
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.418, L.10 – p.420, L.9, p.428, L.15 – p.430, L.7, p.639, Ls.7-16.)
Mr. Herrera’s girlfriend sustained a gunshot wound to the right side of her upper
forehead, and later died of her injuries.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.472, L.1 – p.473, L.21, p.519, Ls.13-20.)
A semi-automatic .380 handgun was identified as the gun involved in the shooting accident.
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.337, Ls.16-25, p.338, Ls.6-23; Plaintiff’s Ex. 2.)  Mr. Herrera told law
enforcement that when he was pulling back the slide to make sure the gun was not loaded, the
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gun went off.  (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol I), p.224, Ls.18-22; Tr. (Vol. I), p.342, Ls.7-15.)1  When
interviewed later that day, he told law enforcement that he had ejected the ammunition
magazine2 and pulled back the slide, and he did not believe there was a round in the chamber of
the gun.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.500, Ls.10-14, p.562, Ls.17-25, p.564, L.1 – p.568, L.6, p.632, Ls.4-11;
Plaintiff’s Ex. 10.)
However, at the first trial,3 Mr. Herrera testified that he had pointed the gun towards
himself after telling his girlfriend he would rather kill himself than go to her parents’ house.
(2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. II), p.127, L.22 – p.128, L.5.)  He testified she then grabbed the barrel of
the gun, pulled it, and it went towards her and went off.  (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. II), p.128, Ls.5-
10.)
During the first trial, four of the State’s witnesses provided testimony as to matters that
had been expressly excluded by the district court at a pre-trial hearing.  Specifically, the district
court had excluded evidence and testimony by third parties relating to statements allegedly made
by Mr. Herrera’s girlfriend regarding her relationship with Mr. Herrera, and events involving
Mr. Herrera.  (Tr. July 13, 2012, p.155, Ls.1-12.)4  Although the  district  court  ruled  that  some
statements were admissible to show the girlfriend’s state of mind, at trial, the State’s witnesses
1 For  ease  of  reference,  citations  to  the  first  trial—the  one  held  in  2013 and  cited  in  the  prior
appeal, No. 41494—will be designated as “2013 Trial Tr.”  The 2016 trial transcript referenced
in this appeal, No. 44596, will not contain a distinguishing date but will simply be designated as
“Tr.”
2 Although the interviewers in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 used the terms “clip” and “magazine”
interchangeably, they are different items.  (See Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.584, Ls.3-6.)   As Detective Van
Leuven explained during the second trial, the correct terminology is to call the metal casing that
encases the bullets a “magazine.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.800, Ls.12-25.)
3 On November 15, 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered the Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s
Transcripts of the prior appeal, No. 41494, to be augmented to include the transcripts and record
in this appeal.  (Limited R., p.463.)
4 The transcript from the July 13, 2012 hearing was part of the transcripts prepared for the prior
appeal, No. 41494.
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testified to specific bad acts the district court had excluded.  (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. I), p.312, Ls.9-
16, p.331, L.10 – p.332, L.7; 2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. II), p.16, L.15 – p.17, L.7, p.64, L.3 – p.66,
L.21.)
At the first trial, the prosecutor tried the case based on the theory that the shooting was
accidental—Mr. Herrera had apparently ejected the magazine before the fatal single shot was
fired and was not aware that the gun still retained a live round in the chamber.  The final words
in the State’s rebuttal closing at the first trial were, “He pulled that gun out, he put it to her head.
He thought he took the bullets out.  He pulled the trigger and the bullet came out.  That’s murder
in the second degree.”  (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. III), p.97, Ls.15-19 (emphasis added).)
After the jury in the first trial found Mr. Herrera guilty of second degree murder (2013
Trial Tr. (Vol. III), p.101, L.18 – p.103, L.24), the district court imposed a unified sentence of
life imprisonment, with twenty-two years fixed.  (2013 Tr. (Vol. I), p.389, L.24 – p.390, L.1.)
Mr. Herrera appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction.
State v. Herrera, 159 Idaho 615 (2015).  The Court held the testimony elicited from the four
witnesses discussed above unfairly prejudiced Mr. Herrera. See id. at 620-24.  The Court noted
the testimony, purportedly offered as bearing on the girlfriend’s state of mind, instead “appears
to have been intended to show previous bad acts of Herrera.” Id. at 624.
The Idaho Supreme Court further stated, “[e]ven more concerning is the rather
transparent  violation  of  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  district  court  on  the  testimony of  these
witnesses.  The order specifically excluded testimony regarding Herrera’s prior bad acts, which
shed little light on the charges he was facing.” Id.  However, “the State asked questions that
appeared to be deliberately designed to elicit the exact testimony that the district court had
specifically prohibited.” Id. The  Court  held,  “[a]  party’s  deliberate  violation  of  an  order
5
excluding evidence with little relevance but with great potential for prejudice is an attack on the
fairness of the proceeding and cannot be countenanced.” Id.  Thus, the Court vacated
Mr. Herrera’s judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.
On remand, the district court granted Mr. Herrera’s motion to disqualify the judge and
reassigned the case to a different district judge, the Honorable John Mitchell.  (Limited
R., pp.17-21.)  A different prosecutor took over the State’s side of the case, and new defense
counsel was appointed to represent Mr. Herrera.  (See Limited R., pp.9, 22-23.)  The district
court scheduled the case for a second trial.  (See Limited R., p.22.)
Before his second trial, Mr. Herrera filed a written motion to replace his defense counsel.
(Limited R., pp.56-57.)  At a hearing on the motion, Mr. Herrera’s counsel clarified the bases for
the motion were that defense counsel would not have adequate time to devote to the case, and
Mr. Herrera told the court that defense counsel had represented his girlfriend’s siblings on
unrelated misdemeanor charges.  (See Tr. (Vol. I), p.73, L.15 – p.80, L.5.)  After the hearing, the
district court denied the motion.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.80, L.6 – p.81, L.9.)
Prior to the second trial, the prosecutor filed a motion to amend the Information to add a
sentencing enhancement because a firearm was used in commission of the crime.  (Limited
R., pp.58-62.)  Over Mr. Herrera’s objection, the district court granted the State’s motion to
amend the Information to add a firearm sentencing enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520.
(Limited R., pp.97-105, 117-18.)  The State sought the sentencing enhancement because it was
concerned that, without the evidence excluded by the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision, there
would  be  a  greater  possibility  for  the  jury  to  find  Mr.  Herrera  guilty  of  manslaughter.   (See
Tr. (Vol. I), p.35, Ls.1-18.)  The State argued the amendment “simply allows the potential top
end of the sentence to go to 25 or 30 years, if manslaughter is found,” and it wanted “the
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opportunity to argue for the same determinate sentence” of twenty-two years that Mr. Herrera
received after the first trial.  (Limited R., pp.58-59.)  In granting the State’s motion to amend, the
district court observed, “the State of Idaho makes it clear it is not seeking an increased penalty.”
(Limited R., p.100.)
At the second trial, the State called an investigating officer, Detective Paul Berger, to
testify as to his interview of Mr. Herrera and Mr. Herrera’s description of how the accident
occurred.  (See generally Tr. (Vol. II), pp.530-587: Plaintiff’s Ex. 10.)  Over defense counsel’s
objections, the State later recalled Detective Berger to inquire “as to whether or not there was
any gunshot residue analysis done upon the body of [Mr. Herrera’s girlfriend], whether there was
any gunshot residue analysis done upon the defendant.”  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.693, L.19 – p.694,
L.2.)  Detective Berger testified no analyses had been done, because “[w]e already know that he
was the one that fired the gun based on his confession that he shot the gun.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.703,
Ls.10-13.)  He also testified there were no gunshot residue tests conducted on Mr. Herrera’s
girlfriend, “[b]ecause we already know that she had been shot in the head with a firearm.”
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.703, Ls.14-19.)  However, when asked to “please describe the limitations of
gunshot residue as a forensic tool,” Detective Berger testified, “when you do a gunshot residue
analysis, it doesn’t quantify how much is on one person.  It just tells you that gunshot residue is
present, so there’s really—it sometimes is difficult to determine who was the one that fired the
gun, but if they’re in close proximity, they’ll both show that they have gunshot residue, just not a
total quantity of what was on there.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.704, L.4 – p.705, L.3.)
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Mr. Herrera did not testify in his defense at the second trial.  (Supp. Tr., p.16, L.7 – p.18,
L.12.)5 However, the State read Mr. Herrera’s testimony from the first trial into the record.  (See
generally Tr. (Vol. II), pp.590-668.)
At the second trial, one of the State’s law enforcement witnesses testified that normally,
when the slide of a gun is pulled back, the bullet in the chamber is ejected.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.566,
Ls.5-9.)   However,  the  gun  used  in  the  incident  was  tested,  and  one  of  the  State’s  witnesses
testified the slide feature of the gun malfunctioned five out of fifty attempts—not ejecting the
bullet when the slide was pulled back.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.916, Ls.13-22.)  The ejected magazine
was photographed with blood on it, next to a nightstand, but some distance away from the large
blood stain.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.766, L.18 – p.767, L.5; Plaintiff’s Exs. 7, 8, 45; Defendant’s Ex. C.)
During closing arguments in the second trial, the prosecutor argued that the shooting was
not an accident, in contrast to the prosecutor’s arguments in the first trial, and that Mr. Herrera
was faking his extreme distress and hysteria following the shooting.  (See Supp. Tr., p.58, Ls.11-
16.)  Alternatively, the prosecutor claimed that it was methamphetamine that was responsible for
Mr. Herrera’s extreme distress, despite trial testimony to the contrary.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.935, L.16
– p.936, L.3; Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.12-21, p.58, Ls.11-16, p.59, Ls.10-14.)  The prosecutor also
called Mr. Herrera a liar or told the jury Mr. Herrera was fabricating over twenty times.  (See
Supp. Tr., p.44, L.15 – p.60, L.4, p.81, L.10 – p.84, L.4.)
The prosecutor argued to the jury that Mr. Herrera did not provide evidence of his
innocence.  (Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.12-20, p.59, Ls.10-14, p.79, Ls.19-22.)  The prosecutor told the
jury multiple times that the fact that it was a contact gunshot wound was enough for them to find
5 The Supplemental Transcript prepared after the Appellant’s objection to the record will
henceforth be referred to as “Supp. Tr.”
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Mr. Hrrera guilty of murder.  (Supp. Tr., p.44, Ls.10-14, p.83, Ls.20-22, p.90, Ls.8-11.)
Additionally, the prosecutor told the jury that “a contact wound to the head with a defendant who
lies equals murder by express malice.”  (Supp. Tr., p.89, L.25 – p.90, L.2.)  The prosecutor also
represented to the jury that there were “people kicking stuff around” in the bedroom, although
there had been no trial testimony that this occurred.  (Supp. Tr., p.87, L.22 – p.88, L.3.)
The jury in the second trial found Mr. Herrera guilty of second degree murder.  (Supp.
Tr., p.107, Ls.1-11.)  Immediately after trial, the district court granted the State’s motion to
dismiss the sentencing enhancement.  (Supp. Tr., p.110, Ls.4-15.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State argued the district court could consider the dismissed
sentencing enhancement when deciding the length of the fixed term of the sentence.  (See
Tr. (Vol. II), p.996, L.13 – p.997, L.25.)  In imposing the sentence, Judge Mitchell observed,
“[t]he greatest thing that impacts my decision compared to [the first sentencing judge’s] decision
is a couple more years have ticked on and we still don’t know what happened the morning of
December 25th, 2011, and that’s the way it will remain forever.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1022, L.25 –
p.1023, L.4.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with thirty
years fixed.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1019, L.25 – p.1020, L.3.)




I. Did the State vindictively prosecute Mr. Herrera by adding a firearm sentencing
enhancement, and did the State commit misconduct when it misled the district court in
order to get its motion to amend the complaint granted?
II. Did the district court err in failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry of Mr. Herrera and his
trial counsel upon Mr. Herrera’s request for substitute counsel?
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it overruled Mr. Herrera’s foundation
objections to Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis?
IV. Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in its closing arguments?
V. Did the accumulation of errors deprive Mr. Herrera of his right to a fair trial?




Mr. Herrera’s Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated By Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
When The Prosecutor Amended The Information To Add A New Sentencing Enhancement And
When He Argued For Its Consideration At Sentencing; The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct
When He Misled The Court As To The Purpose Of The Enhancement
A. Introduction
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits prosecutors and courts
from punishing people for exercising their legal rights.  In the present case, the district court
permitted the State to amend the Information, to allege a new sentencing enhancement for use of
a firearm, after Mr. Herrera successfully challenged his conviction in an earlier
appeal.  (R., pp.42-43; Limited R., pp.117-118.)  While the State dismissed the enhancement, as
promised, it proceeded to use the basis for the enhancement to seek a penalty far beyond the
sentence  after  the  first  trial.   In  seeking  the  amendment  and  in  using  the  basis  for  the
enhancement  to  convince  the  district  court  to  increase  the  sentence,  the  State  vindictively
prosecuted Mr. Herrera.  In urging the district court to allow the amendment to include the
firearm sentencing enhancement, the prosecutor made false assurances to the district court on
which it relied, constituting prosecutorial misconduct.
B. Standard Of Review
This Court exercises free review on the issue of whether a defendant’s due process rights
have been violated in light of the facts of the case. State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 298 (Ct. App.
2003); State  v.  Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 111 (1998).  In examining whether the district court
imposed a vindictive sentence, the reviewing court examines the totality of the circumstances
and the entire record of the case. State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 494 (Ct. App. 1999).
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For alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct followed by a contemporaneous objection,
appellate courts engage in a two-step analysis, determining: (1) whether misconduct occurred;
and (2) whether the misconduct was harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219 (2010).
C. Mr.  Herrera  Had A Due Process  Right  To  Challenge  His  Conviction  And The  Firearm
Sentencing Enhancement Constituted Vindictive Prosecution
Mr. Herrera’s right to due process was violated when the prosecutor charged him with a
new sentencing enhancement, after he exercised his right to a new trial.  His due process right
was again violated when the prosecutor used the (now dismissed) sentencing enhancement to
argue to the district court that Mr. Herrera’s fixed sentence should be increased given the policy
purposes  of  the  firearm  sentencing  enhancement.   Each  of  these  acts  constitute  a  separate
vindictive prosecution.
As the Idaho Court of Appeals has observed, “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause prohibits the government from punishing a person for doing what the law plainly
allows him to do.” State v. Rodriguez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 32 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).  A vindictive prosecution is one “in which a
person is singled out under a law or regulation because the person has exercised a
constitutionally protected right.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (Bryan A. Garner, 8th Ed.,
West 2004).  Courts have similarly noted that “prosecutorial vindictiveness” is a legal term of art
with “a precise and limited meaning” that refers to “a situation in which the government acts
against a defendant in response to the defendant’s prior exercise of constitutional or statutory
rights.” See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  in Bordenkircher succinctly summed up the nature of a due
process violation in the form of a vindictive sentence or vindictive prosecution:
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To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a
due  process  violation  of  the  most  basic  sort,  and  for  an  agent  of  the  State  to
pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his
legal rights is “patently unconstitutional.”
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citation omitted).
In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the defendant exercised his right under North
Carolina law to seek a de novo trial after he was convicted of a misdemeanor and, in response,
the prosecutor obtained a grand jury indictment charging him with a felony. Id. at 22-23.  The
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s due process rights are violated when a
prosecutor vindictively retaliates against a defendant for exercising a legally protected right. Id.
at 27-28.  While finding that there was no evidence that the prosecutor acted maliciously or in
bad faith, the Supreme Court nevertheless vacated the defendant’s conviction, finding, “[d]ue
process of law requires that such a potential for vindictiveness must not enter in to North
Carolina’s two-tiered appellate process” and further found that “it was not constitutionally
permissible” for the State to bring a more serious charge in response to the defendant’s
invocation of his statutory right. Id. at 28-29.
When a prosecutor attempts to retry a defendant and seeks a heavier penalty for the same
act as originally charged, such conduct is inherently suspected as being vindictive. United
States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).  In fact, simply the appearance of
retaliation by a prosecutor in response to a defendant's exercise of a protected right can have
subsequent chilling effects on other defendants with similar circumstances. United States v.
Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1981).  This deterrent effect was considered by the Supreme
Court in fashioning the vindictive prosecution presumption. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28.
That is, the Blackledge Court was concerned not simply with the effect on the defendant against
whom additional or new charges are filed, but with the appearance of vindictiveness that
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chills the free exercise of the right to appeal by all defendants. See Id. at 28.  The Court was
concerned that the prosecutor can discourage appeals by “upping the ante” on the defendant. Id.
at 27-28.  Thus, the “appearance of vindictiveness” rule is prophylactic; it is “designed both to
protect the present defendant from vindictiveness and to prevent a chilling of the exercise of
rights by other defendants in the future.” Motley, 655 F.2d at 188.
In order to show prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant must show either:  (1) actual
vindictiveness by means of objective evidence that a prosecutor acted in order to punish the
defendant for exercising a legal right; or (2) a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, which then
raises a presumption of vindictiveness. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372–73
(1982) (holding that when “action detrimental to the defendant has been taken after the exercise
of a legal right . . . it [is] necessary to ‘presume’ an improper vindictive motive” because motives
are often “complex and difficult to prove”).
Once a defendant has established a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, the
prosecution can rebut the presumption by showing objective reasons justifying the additional
charges. Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 32 n.6 (1984) (“[T]he Blackledge presumption is
rebuttable.”).  In Motley, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted:
If the government increases the severity of the charges following a defendant's
exercise of a procedural right, the sequence of events gives rise to an appearance
of vindictiveness, shifting the burden to the government to prove that the decision
to re-indict with more severe charges did not result from any vindictive motive.
“Instead, the prosecutor, to rebut the presumption, must show his decision to re-
indict with more severe charges was ‘justified by independent reasons or
intervening circumstances which dispel the appearance of vindictiveness.’”
United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir.1980), quoting United States v.
Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1980).
Motley, 655 F.2d at 188 n.1.
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Here, the State’s acts of charging Mr. Herrera with a new sentencing enhancement, and
arguing for additional years of incarceration pursuant to the tenor of the enhancement after the
first conviction was vacated, violated his right to due process as a vindictive prosecution.
Further chilling any other defendant’s decision to exercise his appellate rights is the fact that, not
only did Mr. Herrera not receive a more lenient sentence after his second conviction, but he was
sentenced to an additional eight fixed years in prison after the second trial.  Any defendant who
saw Mr. Herrera prevail on appeal only to be charged with a new sentencing enhancement and
subsequently sentenced to eight additional years, fixed, in prison, would certainly hesitate to
pursue a new trial of his or her own.
1. The State’s Request To Amend The Information To Add A Firearm Sentencing
Enhancement Constituted A Vindictive Prosecution Because The Enhancement
Was Only Sought As Punishment For Mr. Herrera Exercising His Due Process
Right To Challenge His Conviction
In the present case, the prosecutor acted maliciously and in bad faith when he brought a
new sentencing enhancement against Mr. Herrera, after the Idaho Supreme Court granted him a
new trial.  This is true for two reasons:  (1) because the reasons stated by the prosecutor as to
why he was seeking to amend the Information to include a new sentencing enhancement are
factually false, and thus, do not withstand constitutional muster; and (2) because the firearm that
the State relied upon in seeking to enhance the sentence was not newly discovered evidence, but
had been turned over by Mr. Herrera’s mother just minutes after the first responders arrived on
December 25, 2011.  (See Tr. (Vol. I), p.337, Ls.1-25, p.352, Ls.12-21; Tr. (Vol. II), p.439,
Ls.10-22, p.441, Ls.3-19.)  There was no new firearm that could constitute newly discovered
evidence which would have justified the prosecution seeking to add an additional firearm
sentencing enhancement.
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The State filed a motion to amend the Information to add a sentencing enhancement for
using a firearm during the commission of second degree murder.  (Limited R., pp.58-62.)
Mr. Herrera objected and a hearing was held on plaintiff’s motion to amend the Information to
include a firearm enhancement.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.32, L.14 – p.41, L.11.)
At the hearing, the prosecutor reminded the court that he was not part of the first trial or
the appeal process, and said of his motion to amend, “It certainly isn’t any personal
vindictiveness that I would have and -- over the reasons for amending the information.”
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.34, Ls.3-9.)  The prosecutor also provided another seemingly non-vindictive
reason for charging the new firearm enhancement.  The prosecutor claimed that its reason for
amending the information was because, “said decision [of the Idaho Supreme Court] envisions
somewhat the possibility of a conviction for manslaughter, a possibility the earlier prosecutor
likely  didn’t  contemplate,  given  the  evidence  he  had  available  at  the  time of  trial.”    (Limited
R., p.59.) The prosecutor also represented that, because the appellate court decision “limited for
the most part a day’s worth of testimony and four witnesses,” the prosecutor was concerned that
there was a greater possibility for the jury to find Mr. Herrera guilty of manslaughter.  (Tr. (Vol.
I), p.35, Ls.1-11.)  So, to protect its sentence from the first trial, the prosecutor sought
amendment so that if Mr. Herrera was convicted of manslaughter, it would still have an available
sentencing range of 25 to 30 years.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.35, Ls.11-18.)
Defense counsel objected and argued against the amendment as it infringed upon
Mr. Herrera’s constitutional right to a jury trial and to appellate review; “now he is facing a
greater penalty than he would if he is convicted of the offense that he had already been tried for.”
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.36, L.10 – p.37, L.24.)
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The district court granted the motion, relying on the State’s justifications that it wanted to
be able to argue for the same determinate sentence, regardless of whether the jury convicted of
murder or manslaughter and found persuasive that “the State of Idaho makes it clear it is not
seeking an increased penalty” (Limited R., p.100) (emphasis in original), and an Amended
Information alleging a sentence enhancement was filed.  (Limited R., pp.117-118.6)
However, the prosecutor’s purported reasons are constitutionally infirm. First, the
prosecutor’s claim that he could not be vindictively prosecuting in adding a new sentencing
enhancement for the second trial simply because he did not prosecute the first trial is
unsupported by the law.  “[T]he presumption [of vindictiveness]. . . does not hinge on the
continued involvement of a particular individual.  A district attorney burdened with the retrial of
an already-convicted defendant might be no less vindictive because he did not bring the initial
prosecution.” Thigpen,  468  U.S.  at  30–32  (rejecting  the  argument  that  if  two  different
prosecutors are involved, a presumption of vindictiveness is inappropriate).  The Thigpen Court
pointed out that its opinion in Blackledge “referred frequently to actions by ‘the State,’ rather
than ‘the prosecutor.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28–29).
Here, the prosecutor was aware that Mr. Herrera’s 2013 conviction had been vacated and
a new trial ordered because of prosecutorial misconduct.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.34, Ls.5-7, p.35, Ls.1-
18.)  It is clear from his comments that the prosecutor was well aware of the circumstances
surrounding the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision to grant Mr. Herrera a new trial.  (Id.)  Thus,
the prosecutor, “burdened with the retrial of an already-convicted defendant,” would “be no less
vindictive because he did not bring the initial prosecution.” See Thigpen, 468 U.S. at 30-32.
6 The Limited Record on Appeal contains two consecutive pages identified as “118.”
Mr. Herrera is referring to the first page of the record labeled “118.”
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Second, according to the prosecutor, his concerns that this trial might result in a
manslaughter conviction (instead of the second degree murder conviction he was hoping for),
existed because the appellate court had held certain evidence was improperly admitted; evidence
the prosecutor apparently believed he could not get a murder conviction without. The evidence
the prosecutor complained it could not introduce, “a day’s worth of testimony and four
witnesses”  (Tr.  (Vol.  I),  p.35,  Ls.  1-11),  was  evidence  the  district  court  had  held  was
inadmissible at the first trial, but the prosecutor there had impermissibly introduced anyway.
State v. Herrera, 159 Idaho 615, 621-624 (2015) (vacating Mr. Herrera’s conviction where the
State, in violation of the district court’s order, “asked questions that appeared to be deliberately
designed to elicit the exact testimony that the district court had specifically prohibited,” and
holding “[a] party’s deliberate violation of an order excluding evidence with little relevance but
with  great  potential  for  prejudice  is  an  attack  on  the  fairness  of  the  proceeding  and  cannot  be
countenanced”).  Thus, the prosecutor was seeking to “protect a sentence” that had been obtained
by the initial prosecutor’s misconduct in eliciting testimony that the district court had ruled
was inadmissible.
Thirdly, the prosecutor claimed that its reason for amending the information was because,
“said decision [of the Idaho Supreme Court] envisions somewhat the possibility of a conviction
for manslaughter, a possibility the earlier prosecutor likely didn’t contemplate, given the
evidence he had available at the time of trial.”  (Limited R., p.59.) However, the jury was
instructed on lesser included offenses such as voluntary and involuntary manslaughter at the first
trial.  (Limited R., pp.263-65.)  Thus, the purported change in circumstances was fictional.
Further,  whether  the  State  has  proved  Mr.  Herrera  guilty  of  second degree  murder  is  a
question  for  the  jury.   Should  the  jury  determine  that  Mr.  Herrera  was  not  guilty  of  second
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degree murder, it is clearly malicious motives that would impel a prosecutor to vindictively seek
a sentence for second degree murder, for conduct the jury found did not constitute second degree
murder.  The State had no sentence to “protect,” that is, had the jury found Mr. Herrera guilty of
manslaughter, the State could not then seek the same penalty as if they had found him guilty
of murder.
Mr. Herrera’s right to due process was violated when the prosecutor brought a new
sentencing enhancement against him for using a firearm in the commission of the charged crime,
after the district court granted him a new trial.
2. The State’s Request For A Longer Sentence Based On The Dismissed Sentencing
Enhancement Constituted A Vindictive Prosecution Because The Enhancement
Was Only Requested And Awarded As Punishment For Mr. Herrera Exercising
His Due Process Right To Challenge His Conviction
While the prosecutor ultimately dismissed the sentencing enhancement because
Mr. Herrera was again convicted of second degree murder (the firearm enhancement could not
affect the maximum sentence of life), Mr. Herrera asserts that the vindictive prosecution did not
end  when  the  charge  was  dismissed.   At  sentencing,  the  prosecutor  used  the  (now-dismissed)
sentencing enhancement to argue that the district court should increase Mr. Herrera’s sentence.
The district court, over defense counsel’s objection, did consider the enhancement and did
increase the sentence.  Mr. Herrera’s fixed sentence was increased by eight years at his second
sentencing hearing.  The prosecutor’s malicious acts of charging Mr. Herrera with a new
sentencing enhancement and arguing for additional years of incarceration pursuant to the tenor of
the (now dismissed) firearm sentencing enhancement violated his right to due process as a
vindictive prosecution.
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It  is  well-established  in  Idaho  that  the  sentencing  process  is  a  critical  stage  in  the  trial
process and that, therefore, the constitutional right to due process applies at sentencing. See, e.g.,
State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 385 (Ct. App. 2008).  “Once the government has created an
appearance of vindictiveness, it cannot by its own later self-restraint cure the chilling effect of its
original action.” Motley, 655 F.2d at 189-90 (holding defendant established an appearance of
vindictiveness where he was faced with an indictment containing an enhancement provision that
would take effect only if later activated by the prosecution).
After the jury convicted Mr. Herrera of second degree murder, the State moved to dismiss
the sentencing enhancement.  (Supp. Tr., p.110, Ls.4-15.)  The enhancement was dismissed, yet,
at sentencing, the prosecutor urged the court to consider the fifteen-year firearm sentencing
enhancement and impose an increased penalty:
The Prosecutor:  In addition, people of the state have declared that the use of the
gun, if separately proved, and the State did not pursue that at the time of verdict in
this case, but if separately proved, the people of the state are so against guns and
violence that they have provided for an additional fifteen-year term --
Defense Counsel:  Your Honor, I would object to the argument with regards to
that.  The State chose not to seek that.  They were given that opportunity and did
not do so.
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.996, Ls.13-22.)  The district court overruled the objection, finding that it was
permissible argument.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.996, Ls.23-24.)  The prosecutor argued that, while the
State did not pursue the firearms sentencing enhancement, “[I]t can certainly be considered in
fixing the minimum term of this sentencing as a reflection of what the will of the people are in
terms of general or public deterrence.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.996, L.25 – p.997, L.4.)  The prosecutor
argued that the people of Idaho “really don’t want people, drugs and violence and guns mixing
up, and when you do that, if pursued by the State, an additional fifteen years.”  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.997, Ls.4-6.)  The prosecutor told the district court that it could “certainly consider that as
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something to look at when considering the minimum term of this sentence.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.997,
Ls.7-9.)
The  district  court  then  asked  the  prosecutor  to  identify  the  code  section  containing  the
enhancement statute, and clarified that the prosecutor was asking the district court to add that
additional time to the mandatory minimum.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.997, Ls.18-25.)
Thereafter, the district court sentenced Mr. Herrera to life, with thirty years fixed; a
difference of an additional eight years, fixed, from the sentence after Mr. Herrera’s first trial.7
(Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.1020,  Ls.1-3.)   It  is  clear  from  the  prosecutor’s  actions  in  urging  the  court  to
consider the length and purpose of the sentencing enhancement that he was seeking an increased
sentence, despite saying earlier that he would not be asking for an increased sentence.  The
prosecutor’s actions in seeking to add the firearm enhancement and in arguing a dismissed
enhancement to the court constituted vindictive prosecution.
D. The State’s Sentencing Argument Urging The Court To Consider The Additional
Statutory Penalty For Using A Firearm Constituted Prosecutorial Misconduct Because
The State Initially Misled The Court To Grant The Amendment
Mr. Herrera contends that the prosecutor lied to the district court, defense counsel, and
Mr. Herrera when he claimed that the firearms enhancement would only be used to protect the
original sentence, and that, notwithstanding his dismissal of the charge after hearing the verdict,
he breached an implied promise when he argued in favor of an increased penalty based on the
intent of the dismissed firearm enhancement at sentencing.
While this deception is certainly troubling in and of itself, see IDAHO R. OF PROF.
CONDUCT 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting the knowing making of false statements to a tribunal), it also
7 After the first trial, Mr. Herrera was sentenced to life, with twenty-two years fixed.  (R, pp.279-
283.)
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constitutes misconduct. See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571-72 (2007) (finding misconduct
where the prosecutor represented one thing to the district court, then did another); Herrera, 159
Idaho at  623-24  (vacating  Mr.  Herrera’s  conviction  where  the  State,  in  violation  of  the  district
court’s order, “asked questions that appeared to be deliberately designed to elicit the exact
testimony that the district court had specifically prohibited,” and holding “[a] party’s deliberate
violation of an order excluding evidence with little relevance but with great potential for
prejudice is an attack on the fairness of the proceeding and cannot be countenanced”); State v.
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) (finding prosecutor’s conduct in telling court and defense counsel
a witness would testify about vehicle speed and deceased’s location, but instead eliciting
testimony describing grisly injuries suffered by decedent, was “unnecessarily misleading”).
Accordingly, the prosecutor’s conduct violates the general duty of candor that attorneys
owe as officers of the court.  In addition to the duty of candor mandated under ABA Model Rule
3.3, many courts have noted that there exists a “general duty of candor imposed on all attorneys
as officers of the court.” See Board of License Commissioners of Town of Tiverton v. Pastore,
469 U.S. 238, 240 (1985) (attorneys, as officers of the court, owe a general duty of candor to the
court); United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1993) (“the lawyer’s
duties to maintain the confidences of a client and advocate vigorously are trumped ultimately by
a duty to guard against the corruption that justice will be dispensed on an act of deceit”); see also
United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Management of Va.,
Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 925 (4th Cir.1994) (“[A] lawyer's duty of candor to the court must always
prevail in any conflict with the duty of zealous advocacy.”); Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242,
249 (7th Cir.1988) (“[L]awyers have a duty of candor to the tribunal. Counsel for appellant
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would  be  well-advised  to  observe  that  violations  of  this  duty  can  lead  to  sanctions  even  more
severe than payment of an opponent's fees and costs.”).
Prosecutors,  in  particular,  owe  a  duty  of  candor. See United States v. Wold, 979 F.2d
632, 635 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding prosecutor’s conduct in telling trial court at a pre-trial motion
hearing that a witness would not be testifying, but later calling that witness to testify at trial, was
improper); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (prosecutor has “special
duty not to mislead”).
In the State’s motion to amend, the prosecution represented to the district court that it was
only seeking to amend the Information to add a sentencing enhancement to protect the earlier
sentence of life, with twenty years fixed.  (Limited R., pp.58-59.)  The prosecutor represented
that,  due  to  the  inadmissibility  of  the  testimony  of  several  witnesses  regarding  Mr.  Herrera’s
prior bad acts, Mr. Herrera may be convicted of manslaughter, instead of second degree murder.
(Limited R., p.59.)  A conviction for manslaughter was “a possibility the earlier prosecutor likely
didn’t contemplate, given the evidence he had available at the time of trial.”  (Limited R., p.59.)
The prosecution asserted that there would be no prejudice to the defendant, the amendment
would “simply allow[] the potential top end of the sentence to go to 25 or 30 years, if
manslaughter is found.”  (Limited R., p.59.)
In granting the State’s motion to amend the Information, the district court relied on the
prosecutor’s argument that he was just protecting his sentence.  The court reasoned:
If the jury convicts of murder in the second degree, the deadly weapon [sic]
enhancement is a nullity, as the maximum possible sentence for murder in the
second degree is life in prison with a mandatory minimum ten years in prison.
I.C. § 18-8004.  However, if the jury is instructed on a manslaughter charge, and
the jury convicted Herrera on that charge, the deadly [sic] weapon enhancement
provision would extend the maximum sentencing range by fifteen years, from
fifteen years maximum for voluntary manslaughter (I.C. § 18-4006(1)) to thirty
years, including the deadly weapon enhancement.
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(Limited R., pp.99-100.)  The district court relied on the State’s justifications that it wanted to be
able to argue for the same determinate sentence, regardless of whether the jury convicted of
murder or manslaughter and found persuasive that “the State of Idaho makes it clear it is not
seeking an increased penalty.”  (Limited R., p.100) (emphasis in original).  After the jury
convicted  Mr.  Herrera  of  second  degree  murder,  the  State  moved  to  dismiss  Count  II,  the
sentencing enhancement, and the district court dismissed Count II.  (Supp. Tr., p.110, Ls.4-15.)
The prosecution went back on its word, however, at sentencing, when it argued that the
purposes behind the sentencing enhancement necessitated the court to increase the minimum
period of confinement because, “the people of the state are so against guns and violence that they
have provided for an additional fifteen-year term.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.996, Ls.13-18.)
The court overruled defense counsel’s objection, and the prosecutor argued that, even
though the State dismissed the firearm sentencing enhancement, the court could certainly
consider  the  enhancement  when  fixing  the  minimum  term  of  Mr.  Herrera’s  sentence  “as  a
reflection of what the will of the people are in terms of general or public deterrence.”  (Tr. (Vol.
II), p.996, L.19 – p.997, L.4.)
After the court clarified that the prosecutor was asking it to add that enhancement to the
mandatory minimum, the court sentenced Mr. Herrera to life, with thirty years fixed.  (Tr. (Vol.
II), p.997, Ls.18-23, p.1020, Ls.1-3.)  This sentence was eight fixed years greater than the one
imposed  after  the  first  trial.   (R.,  pp.279-282.)   However,  no  new  facts  had  come  to  light,  no
additional weapons were located, and Mr. Herrera did not engage in any egregious conduct while
in prison. See generally, 2016 Presentencing Investigation Report (“PSI”).  Clearly the district
court was persuaded by the State’s argument that the use of a firearm warranted an increased
minimum sentence and it increased Mr. Herrera’s minimum sentence as a result.
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The State’s argument asking the court to add additional time to the fixed portion of the
sentence was prosecutorial misconduct.  The prosecutor effectively misled the court into granting
its motion to amend with the promise that the penalty would not be increased, but at sentencing
sought exactly that—an increased penalty for using a firearm.  Such constitutes misconduct.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of Mr. Herrera And
His Trial Counsel Upon Mr. Herrera’s Request For Substitute Counsel Thereby Depriving Him
Of His Right To Counsel Protected By The Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments Of The United
States Constitution As Well As Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution
A. Introduction
Although Mr. Herrera filed a letter requesting new counsel, during a hearing on the
matter, the district court did not offer Mr. Herrera a chance to speak regarding his concern that
his counsel was not prepared for trial.  Mr. Herrera was only permitted to speak briefly regarding
his concern about an actual conflict between himself and his counsel before he was cut off by the
court.  The district court did not delve into either of the problems Mr. Herrera had been having
with his counsel before it denied Mr. Herrera the opportunity to address the conflict(s) any
further.  This failure to provide Mr. Herrera with a full and fair opportunity to present the facts in
support of his request for substitute counsel deprived him of his right to counsel protected by
both the federal and Idaho Constitutions.  As such, Mr. Herrera’s case must be remanded to the
district court in order for the court to conduct the constitutionally mandated hearing in order to
determine whether good cause exists for the appointment of substitute counsel and for any
further proceedings that may be necessary as a result of the trial court’s determination.
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B.   Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
When  the  defendant  objects  to  a  conflict  of  interest  with  his  counsel,  the  court  has  an
affirmative duty to inquire into the potential conflict. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704
(2009).  If the trial court fails to conduct an adequate inquiry, the defendant’s conviction must be
reversed regardless of whether the conflict adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. Id.  The
adequacy of a trial court’s inquiry is a constitutional issue over which the courts exercise free
review. Id.
Both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee the right to counsel for criminal defendants.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456 (1967); State v.
Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007).  The right to counsel encompasses the right to
effective assistance of counsel. State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897 (1980).  Regardless of
whether counsel is retained or appointed, a criminal defendant has a right to conflict-free
counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980).  However, the right to counsel does not
necessarily encompass the right to counsel of one’s own choosing. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594.
“Mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for
substitute counsel in absence of extraordinary circumstances.” Id.  A trial court has discretion to
appoint substitute counsel for good cause. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 897; State v. Peck, 130 Idaho
711, 713 (Ct. App. 1997).  This Court reviews the district court’s determination as to whether to
appoint substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-15
(2002).
Where a defendant requests substitute counsel, the district court is under no obligation to
affirmatively act as an advocate for the defendant in determining whether to appoint substitute
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counsel. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898.  But the court nevertheless must afford the defendant a full
and fair hearing on the request for substitute counsel. Id.
This  is  the  case  even  where  the  trial  court  maintains  some  initial  skepticism  as  to  the
basis for the defendant’s request.  As was noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Peck,
“even well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and manipulative tactics can provide no
substitute for the inquiries necessary to protect a defendant’s constitutional rights.”  130 Idaho at
714 (quoting United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1982)).
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of Mr. Herrera
Upon Mr. Herrera’s Request For Appointment Of Substitute Counsel
On March 9, 2016, Mr. Herrera filed a written motion to replace his defense counsel.
(Limited R., pp.56-57.)  During the March 22, 2016 hearing, the district court elicited
information from defense counsel regarding the basis for Mr. Herrera’s motion.  (Tr. (Vol. I),
p.73, L.15 – p.75, L.19.)  Defense counsel advised the court that the letter from his client
indicated his client’s position, and he represented that Mr. Herrera was concerned about the
amount of time that defense counsel would be able to devote to his case between now and the
trial.   (Tr.  (Vol.  I),  p.73, Ls.18-22.)   Defense counsel explained that he did not have sufficient
time  to  work  on  the  case,  and  advised  the  court  was  why  he  was  asking  for  a  continuance.
(Tr. (Vol. I), Tr., p.73, L.18 – p.75, L.19.)  Defense counsel also told the court he and his client
were having some differences with regards to trial tactics, “but there are some fundamental
differences that I’m concerned about that I do not wish to discuss in open court nor do I think
that’s appropriate, but they are concerning.”  (Tr. (Vol. I), Tr., p.75, Ls.9-19.)  However, rather
than asking Mr. Herrera about the concerns, the district court instead spoke only to defense
counsel regarding this issue.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.73, L.15 – p.77, L.15.)
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When  the  district  court  did  finally  ask  Mr.  Herrera  about  the  substance  of  his  motion,
Mr. Herrera began to explain a different conflict, one his counsel did not previously mention but
which involved defense counsel’s representation of the victim’s brother and sister on unrelated
misdemeanor charges.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.77, Ls.21-25.)  Mr. Herrera only spoke a couple sentences
before the district court admonished him to be quiet:
THE COURT:  And is there anything that you want to tell me regarding this
motion, Mr. Herrera?
THE  DEFENDANT:   Um,  yes,  sir.   I  also  would  like  the  Court  to  know  that
Mr. Andersen represented Jack and Kaytlin Comack.  Those are siblings to
Stefanie. Um, I asked him verbally and he told me he didn’t remember or recall,
so I sent him two certified letters, and um, right there on the bottom where the
black is will indicate his response and when -- the date up top is when I got the
response back.
THE COURT:  So --
THE DEFENDANT:  I had heard from other inmates that --
THE COURT:  I’m going to hand back the March 7th letter from Mr. Andersen to
you --
THE DEFENDANT:  Down in the black --
THE COURT:  -- let me finish.
THE DEFENDANT:  Sorry, sir.
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.77, L.21 – p.78, L.13.)  After interrupting Mr. Herrera, the district court inquired
of defense counsel, who explained that he did not believe there was a conflict under Idaho Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.7 that would affect his ability to represent Mr. Herrera.  (Tr. (Vol. I),
p.78, L.19 – p.80, L.5.)  The district court denied the motion to replace defense attorney, saying
it trusted defense counsel to assess the possibility of any conflict of interest under the Rules of
Professional  Conduct.   (Tr.  (Vol.  I),  p.80,  Ls.6-18.)   The  court  found  that  it  did  not  have  any
evidence of the “other fundamental differences,” presumably meaning Mr. Herrera’s allegation
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that defense counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare his case for trial; that defense counsel
was a very experienced attorney; and that there was no pending motion to continue.  (Tr. (Vol. I),
p.80, L.19 – p.81, L.9.)  The district court reiterated its statements that appointed defense counsel
was “an attorney with significant past experience, specifically, significant past criminal law
experience, and more specifically, significant past criminal defense experience.”  (Limited
R., p.114.)  However, this decision failed to address the concerns raised by Mr. Herrera.
Mr. Herrera was concerned that his counsel was unprepared for trial and that there was an actual
conflict with the representation of the victim’s siblings on past misdemeanor charges.
The lack of analysis by the district court is strikingly similar to the district court’s process
in Nath, supra.  In Nath, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to conduct the
mandated inquiry upon the defendant’s request for substitute counsel. Nath, 137 Idaho at 714-
715.  The defendant in Nath requested substitute counsel due to the fact that trial counsel had
failed to investigate certain potential witnesses and failed to obtain the documents requested by
the defendant. Id.   In response,  the district  court  did not review the totality of the defendant’s
claims but merely characterized the defendant’s dissatisfactions with counsel as a complaint that
his trial counsel was not following the defendant’s requests and instructions. Id. at 715.  Because
the trial court did not provide the defendant an adequate opportunity to explain his reasons for
seeking substitute counsel, and because the trial court’s “review of this motion did not
encompass  the  totality  of  [the  defendant’s]  claims,”  the  Court  in Nath held  that  the  trial  court
failed to provide the defendant with the required full and fair hearing on his request. Id.
In this case, Mr. Herrera filed a document requesting a “change of lawyer.”  (Limited
R., pp.56-57.)  At the hearing, there were two problems identified:  (1) defense counsel did not
have sufficient time to devote to working on Mr. Herrera’s case; and (2) defense counsel dually
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represented both Mr. Herrera and the siblings of the woman shot by Mr. Herrera.  However, the
district court did not question Mr. Herrera as to the specifics of Mr. Herrera’s claim that his
counsel would not be able to devote sufficient time to his case before the trial date.  Further, as to
the other issue brought up by Mr. Herrera—the actual conflict of defense counsel due to the dual
representation by defense counsel, the court cut off Mr. Herrera and did not allow him to finish
explaining the conflict.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.77, L.21 – p.78, L.13.)  The court was remiss in its
obligation to inquire further of Mr. Herrera regarding both potential conflicts.
Here, just as in Nath, the district court conducted an incomplete assessment of the request
and  apparently  failed  to  understand  the  totality  of  both  of  Mr.  Herrera’s  claims.   Mr.  Herrera
asserts that the district court failed to conduct the full and fair hearing required by law upon his
request for substitute counsel, and that a remand of his case is therefore appropriate so that the
trial court may properly determine whether there exists good cause for the appointment of
substitute counsel.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Overruled Mr. Herrera’s Foundation
Objections To Detective Berger’s Testimony On Gunshot Residue Analysis
A. Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it overruled Mr. Herrera’s foundation
objections to Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis.  Detective Berger did not
have practical experience or special knowledge that would qualify him as an expert on gunshot
residue analysis.  The State will not be able to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the district court’s abuse of discretion was harmless.
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The State initially called Detective Berger to testify about his interview or interrogation
of Mr. Herrera.  (See generally Tr. (Vol. II), p.530, L.20 – p.587, L.3.)  He also helped the State
read into the record Mr. Herrera’s testimony from the first trial.  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.587, L.7 –
p.588, L.4.)
When the State later recalled Detective Berger as a witness, Mr. Herrera objected.  (See
Tr. (Vol. II), p.692, L.21 – p.693, L.12.)  Outside the presence of the jury, the State told the
district court it was recalling Detective Berger to inquire “as to whether or not there was any
gunshot residue analysis done upon the body of [Mr. Herrera’s girlfriend], whether there was any
gunshot residue analysis done upon the defendant.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.693, L.19 – p.694, L.2.)  On
the issue of gunshot residue analysis, Mr. Herrera objected on the grounds there was no
disclosure of a gunshot residue kit, and there was no testimony that Detective Berger dealt with
it.   (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.694, Ls.12-19.)  Mr. Herrera also noted Detective Berger had not done
the analysis of the gunshot residue kit.  (See Tr.  Vol.  II,  p.696,  Ls.8-11.)   The  State  told  the
district court it anticipated Detective Berger, as the handling case officer, would testify no
gunshot residue on Mr. Herrera or his girlfriend had been tested, and the detective would have an
explanation for why it was not tested.  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.696, L.24 – p.697, L.5.)  The district
court overruled Mr. Herrera’s objections.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.699, Ls.12-20.)
Upon his recall, Detective Berger testified he was familiar with what gunshot residue
was.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.700, Ls.21-22.)  The State asked Detective Berger to explain what gunshot
residue was, and the district court sustained Mr. Herrera’s objection on the basis of foundation.
(Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.700,  L.23  –  p.701,  L.2.)   The  State  then  asked  how the  detective  was  familiar
with gunshot residue, and he answered, “[t]hrough my experience and training I’m familiar—and
cases I’ve worked I know about gunshot residue.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.701, Ls.3-7.)  The State asked
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him, “[c]ould you please describe your training as it relates to gunshot residue?”  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.701, Ls.8-9.)  Detective Berger replied, “[m]y experience as it pertains to gunshot residue has
to do with when there’s a shooting-type scene, we used to take swabs of hands and stuff like that
to determine if there was gunshot residue on the hands and any parts of the body.”  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.701, Ls.10-14.)  The district court overruled Mr. Herrera’s foundation objection to the State’s
next question, on whether gunshot residue was chemical constituents or compounds typically left
after the discharge of a firearm.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.701, Ls.15-20.)
The State then asked Detective Berger, “could you tell us a little bit more about your
experience with [gunshot residue] as it relates to your experience as a detective?”  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.702, Ls.9-11.)  The detective stated, “[t]hroughout my career as being a detective I’ve been
involved in numerous scenes where guns have been fired or homicides, assaults, batteries, those
kind of things, so based on that I’ve had the ability to work with or be part of a gunshot residue
case.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.702, Ls.12-16.)  Detective Berger testified he had become familiar with
gunshot residue through those experiences, and was familiar with the limitations of gunshot
residue.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.702, Ls.17-22.)
After Detective Berger explained what gunshot residue was, the State asked him, “[w]ere
there any analyses concerning gunshot residue conducted upon the defendant?”  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.702, L.23 – p.703, L.9.)  Detective Berger testified there were not, because “[w]e already know
that he was the one that fired the gun based on his confession that he shot the gun.”  (Tr. (Vol.
II), p.703, Ls.10-13.)  He also testified there were no gunshot residue tests conducted on
Mr. Herrera’s girlfriend, “[b]ecause we already know that she had been shot in the head with a
firearm.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.703, Ls.14-19.)
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The State asked, “[w]ould you have any concerns about the limitations of gunshot residue
in terms of its ability to indicate forensically who shot the firearm.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.703, Ls.20-
22.)  Mr. Herrera objected on the basis that “[t]here’s not been sufficient foundation to qualify
this person as an expert in gunshot residue and its analysis,” but the district court overruled the
objection.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.703, L.24 – p.704, L.3.)  Detective Berger answered “yes” to the
question, and the State next asked him to “please describe the limitations of gunshot residue as a
forensic tool.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.704, Ls.4-6.)  Mr. Herrera then objected: “this person has not
been qualified as an expert, has not testified that he’s been involved in the forensic analysis of
gunshot residue; simply indicating that he’s had some experience with it in investigations, but
he’s not participated in any analyzation of gunshot residue from a party, nor participated in how
it is analyzed or has he been qualified to testify as to what particles or what gunshot residue show
or don’t show.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.704, Ls.7-16.)
The district court overruled the objection.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.704, L.20.)  Detective Berger
then testified, “when you do a gunshot residue analysis, it doesn’t quantify how much is on one
person.  It just tells you that gunshot residue is present, so there’s really—it sometimes is
difficult to determine who was the one that fired the gun, but if they’re in close proximity, they’ll
both show that they have gunshot residue, just not a total quantity of what was on there.”
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.704, L.21 – p.705, L.3.)  Mr. Herrera asserts Detective Berger did not have
practical experience or special knowledge that would qualify him as an expert on gunshot residue
analysis, and thus the district court abused its discretion when it overruled Mr. Herrera’s
foundation objections to Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis.
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B. Standard Of Review
A district  court’s  determination  that  a  witness  is  qualified  as  an  expert  is  discretionary,
and  an  appellate  court  reviews  the  record  to  decide  if  that  determination  was  an  abuse  of  this
discretion. West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138 (1998).  When reviewing an exercise of
discretion, an appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into whether the district court:  (1)
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of such
discretion  and  consistently  with  any  legal  standards  applicable  to  specific  choices;  and  (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
C. The  District  Court  Abused  Its  Discretion  When  It  Overruled  Mr.  Herrera’s  Foundation
Objections To Detective Berger’s Testimony On Gunshot Residue Analysis, Because
Detective Berger Did Not Qualify As An Expert
Mr.  Herrera  asserts  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion  when  it  overruled  his
foundation objections to Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis, because
Detective Berger did not have practical experience or special knowledge that would qualify him
as an expert on gunshot residue analysis.  The Idaho Rules of Evidence provide that, “[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence  or  to  determine  a  fact  in  issue,  a  witness  qualified  as  an  expert  by  knowledge,  skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
I.R.E. 702.
Thus, “[a] qualified expert is one who possesses ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education.’” Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837 (2007) (quoting I.R.E. 702).
“Formal training is not necessary, but practical experience or special knowledge must be shown
to bring a witness within the category of an expert.” Id.  “The proponent of the testimony must
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lay foundational evidence showing that the individual is qualified as an expert on the topic of his
or her testimony.” Id.
Here, the State did not lay that required foundational evidence showing Detective Berger
was qualified as an expert on the topic of gunshot residue analysis. State v. Zimmerman, 121
Idaho 971 (1992), a lewd conduct case, helps illustrate why Detective Berger was not qualified.
In Zimmerman, the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court properly limited the testimony of
the defendant’s expert witness. See Zimmerman, 121 Idaho at 972, 978.  The defendant in
Zimmerman sought to elicit testimony from the expert that it was more likely that the victim was
not abused than that she was abused. Id. at 978.  The expert was a licensed social worker who
had performed a home-study of the victim’s parents concerning a previous child protective
action regarding the victim. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court  in Zimmerman held, “it is evident that the trial court limited
the testimony because [the defendant] laid an insufficient foundation regarding [the expert’s]
qualifications in child sexual abuse matters.” Id.  According to the Zimmerman Court, “[t]here
was no evidence in the record that [the expert] had training or experience in the investigation of
child sexual abuse allegations.  Nor was it clear whether [the expert’s] job . . . required him to
investigate child sexual abuse cases.” Id.  “Based upon these insufficiencies in the record,” the
Zimmerman Court held “the trial court properly excluded the testimony.” Id.
Conversely, in State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758 (1993), a murder case, the Idaho
Supreme Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a witness for the
State to testify as an expert regarding blood spatter evidence. See Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at
760, 763-64.  The expert “testified that he had taken a one-week course in blood spatter patterns
taught by a professional instructor, that he received training in crime scene evaluation in his
35
training as a forensic pathologist, that he had interpreted blood spatter patterns and investigated
crime scenes on a number of occasions, and that he had given testimony on blood spatter patterns
in other cases.” Id. at 763-64.  The Raudebaugh Court emphasized that the Court “has held that
a witness’s expertise may be based on actual field experience in the particular area.” Id. at 764.
“Given [the expert’s] testimony about his qualifications to give expert testimony concerning
blood spatters,” the Court held, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allow [him] to
testify as an expert under I.R.E. 702.” Id.
Here, Detective Berger did not have practical experience or special knowledge that would
qualify him as an expert on gunshot residue analysis.  Similar to the lack of evidence concerning
the expert’s qualifications in Zimmerman, see 121 Idaho at 978, there was no evidence in the
record showing Detective Berger had training or experience in the analysis of gunshot residue.
Rather, Detective Berger testified his only experience with gunshot residue “has to do with when
there’s a shooting-type scene, we used to take swabs of hands and stuff like that to determine if
there was gunshot residue on the hands and any parts of the body.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.701, Ls.8-
14.)  He also testified he had “been involved in numerous scenes where guns have been fired or
homicides, assaults, batteries, those kind of things, so based on that I’ve had the ability to work
with or be part of a gunshot residue case.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.702, Ls.12-16.)  While the detective
testified he had become familiar with gunshot residue through those experiences (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.702, Ls.17-19), unlike the expert in Raudebaugh, see 124 Idaho at 763-64, Detective Berger
never testified he had ever interpreted or analyzed gunshot residue.
The sum of Detective Berger’s testimony was that he had been involved in the collection
of gunshot residue evidence.  However, the topic of his expert testimony was not the collection
of gunshot residue evidence, but rather what that evidence would indicate about who fired a
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gun—the analysis of gunshot residue.8  The State, as proponent of Detective Berger’s testimony,
did not lay the required foundation evidence showing he was qualified as an expert on the topic
of gunshot residue analysis. See Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837.  Thus, the district court abused its
discretion when it overruled Mr. Herrera’s foundation objections to Detective Berger’s testimony
on gunshot residue analysis.
D. The  State  Will  Be  Unable  To  Prove  That  The  District  Court’s  Abuse  Of  Discretion  In
Overruling  The  Objections  To  Detective  Berger’s  Testimony  Is  Harmless  Beyond  A
Reasonable Doubt
The State will be unable to prove that the district court’s abuse of discretion in overruling
the objections to Detective Berger’s testimony is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Where
alleged  error  is  followed  by  a  contemporaneous  objection  and  the  appellant  shows  that  a
violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To
hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction.” State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
8 Additionally, some of Detective Berger’s testimony was factually incorrect.  He testified,
“when you do a gunshot residue analysis, it doesn’t quantify how much is on one person.”
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.704, Ls.21-24.)  However, it is well-established that gunshot residue analyses
may actually quantify the amount of gunshot residue found on the persons tested. See State v.
Warden, 100 Idaho 21, 24 (1979) (describing a forensic scientist’s testimony on how a gunshot
residue test showed areas of the defendant’s hands “contained gunshot residue in excess of seven
or eight times the amount normally found on an individual’s hands when that individual
discharges  a  weapon.   Further,  the  gunshot  residue  found  was  in  excess  of  over  one  thousand
times the amount normally found on an individual’s hands when that individual discharges a
weapon”).
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Here, the State will not be able to show there was no reasonable possibility the district
court’s abuse of discretion contributed to the conviction.  The State’s theory of the case was that
Mr. Herrera murdered his girlfriend, because she had a contact gunshot wound and Mr. Herrera
had repeatedly lied.  (See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.44, Ls.10-20.)  Mr. Herrera’s theory of the case was
that the shooting was accidental, and he did not know the gun was loaded when his girlfriend
grabbed it and it went off.  (See Supp. Tr., p.73, Ls.22-25.)  According to Mr. Herrera, the State
argued he was walking when he shot the gun, but that did not conform to the evidence.  (See
Supp. Tr., p.62, Ls.3-6.)  Mr. Herrera asserted the physical evidence instead indicated he was
sitting when he had the gun.  (See Supp. Tr., p.62, Ls.7-22.)
Detective Berger’s testimony on why the State did not conduct a gunshot residue test was
important to the State’s theory of the case.  As discussed above, the State told the district court it
was recalling Detective Berger to explain why gunshot residue analysis had not been conducted
on Mr.  Herrera  or  his  girlfriend.   (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.696, L.24 – p.697, L.5.)  In his closing
argument, Mr. Herrera asserted that, although the State had years to conduct an investigation, it
did not analyze the gunshot residue kit for Mr. Herrera’s girlfriend’s hands “[b]ecause it doesn’t
fit their theory of the case.”  (Supp. Tr., p.64, Ls.8-13.)  Mr. Herrera later asserted the State
“can’t  overcome this  physical  evidence  of  where  that  gun  had  to  be  when the  gun  discharged.
They can’t overcome that.  They chose not to do the gun residue test.”  (Supp. Tr., p.72, Ls.6-
10.)
In its rebuttal, the State argued it was not suggesting Mr. Herrera was walking and shot
the firearm, but rather that came from Mr. Herrera’s first explanation for his girlfriend’s death.
(See Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.21.)  The State argued that explanation “was later contradicted by him
and the physical evidence.”  (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.19-21.)  The State subsequently contended,
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based on Detective Berger’s testimony, that “[g]unshot residue does nothing more than indicate
the presence of a recently-fired firearm.  It doesn’t indicate who, it’s just presence and proximity.
It’s not useful for forensics.”  (Supp. Tr., p.84, Ls.9-14.)  The State claimed bringing up the
gunshot residue was part of Mr. Herrera’s trying to “misdirect” the jury “from the overwhelming
strength of the evidence of a contact gunshot wound.”  (See Supp. Tr., p.84, Ls.16-20.)
  Without Detective Berger’s testimony on gunshot residue analysis, the State would have
lost  some support  for its  theory of the case,  and would also have not been able to bring up the
above  argument  in  rebuttal  to  Mr.  Herrera’s  assertions  on  gunshot  residue.   If  the  State  had
wanted to properly offer such rebuttal, it could have presented testimony from a witness who was
actually qualified as an expert on gunshot residue analysis.  Thus, the State will not be able to
show there was no reasonable possibility the district court’s abuse of discretion contributed to the
conviction. See Sharp, 101  Idaho  at  507.   The  State  will  be  unable  to  prove  that  the  district
court’s abuse of discretion in overruling the objections to Detective Berger’s testimony is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments
A. Introduction
Mr. Herrera asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, was
violated  when  the  prosecutor,  in  closing  arguments,  called  him  a  liar  over  twenty  times,
misrepresented the State’s burden of proof, misrepresented the evidence, and misrepresented the
law.  Mr. Herrera asserts that the prosecutor’s improper closing arguments lowered the State’s
burden of proof, which requires reversal of his conviction.
39
B. Standard Of Review
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if the
misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
132, 141 (2014). To prove an error is fundamental, a defendant bears the burden of proving:
(1) the error violated one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error
is obvious from the existing record; and (3) the error was not harmless. Id.; State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 226 (2010).  If a defendant demonstrates one of his unwaived constitutional rights
was plainly violated, this Court applies the harmless error test to determine whether the
defendant has shown there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome of the trial.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If so, the conviction is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
Id. at 228. Mr. Herrera acknowledges that he did not contemporaneously object to the
prosecutor’s statements and thus the statements must be evaluated as fundamental error.
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Repeatedly Calling
Mr. Herrera A Liar, Misstating The Facts And Evidence, And Misstating The State’s
Burden Of Proof
“[I]t  [is]  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  establish  .  .  .  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt.   This  notion—basic  in  our  law  and  rightly  one  of  the  boasts  of  a  free  society—is  a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of ‘due
process.’” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  The
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  Similarly,
the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  Additionally, the Idaho
Constitution also guarantees that, “[n]o person shall be … deprived of life, liberty or property
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without due process of law.”  Idaho Const. art. I, § 13.  Due process requires criminal trials to be
fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978).  Prosecutorial
misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318
(Ct. App. 2005).  In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct
must be of sufficient consequence to result  in the denial  of the defendant’s right to a fair  trial.
The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219
(1982).  The aim of due process is not the punishment of society for the misdeeds of the
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
Prosecutors too often forget that  they are a part  of the machinery of the court,  and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, ___, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903).  The
prosecutor’s duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent
evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id., 71 P. at
611.  The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences.
Id., 71 P. at 611.
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.  “Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the
facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)
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(internal punctuation marks omitted).  “Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.” State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20
(Ct. App. 2008).  Misrepresentations or diminishments of the State’s burden to prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
758, 769 (1993); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).  “It is improper to
misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument.” Moses, 156 Idaho at 871
(quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)).  Nor should closing argument
include counsel’s personal opinion about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of
the accused. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11 (1979).
1. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Calling Mr. Herrera A Liar More
Than Twenty Times In Closing Arguments
In closing argument, the State repeatedly called Mr. Herrera a liar and repetitiously told
jurors  Mr.  Herrera  was  fabricating.   Defense  counsel  did  not  object  to  any  of  the  prosecutor’s
statements.  The prosecutor’s relentless name-calling constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor used the word “lie” or “fabricate” (or like
variations) in each of the following statements to the jury:
1.  The evidence shows that the defendant has lied.  (Supp. Tr., p.44, L.15.)
2.  His statements are not to be believed.  (Supp. Tr., p.44, L.18.)
3.  A contact gunshot wound plus a lying defendant equals murder.  (Supp. Tr., p.44,
Ls.19-20.)
4.  There is the guilty conscience and lies of the defendant.  (Supp. Tr., p.47, Ls.11-12.)
5.  He is not worthy of any credibility.  (Supp. Tr., p.48, Ls.1-2.)
6.  He is not telling the truth.  Innocent people do not lie.  Guilty people lie.  (Supp.
Tr., p.49, Ls.15-16.)
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7.  And those major contradictions [in testimony] are not the product of a faulty memory
or a recollection enhanced over a year of time; that is the product of fabrication.  (Supp.
Tr., p.50, Ls.10-13.)
8.  He has to create a new story in order to explain away the forensics.  And that’s exactly
what he did; fabricate and lie.  (Supp. Tr., p.50, Ls.23-25.)
9.  The second story not only fails because it’s an obvious fabrication meant to meet
physical evidence, it fails to withstand the scrutiny of common sense and logic.  (Supp.
Tr., p.51, Ls.1-3.)
10.  His answer is, “I don’t know.”  He doesn’t know because it’s a fabrication.  (Supp.
Tr., p.52, Ls.8-9.)
11.  No; that is not a believable action.  That is a fabrication, and the only one he could
come up with to explain the contact gunshot wound.  His statement cannot be believed.
(Supp. Tr., p.53, Ls.15-18.)
12.  The defendant had very convenient amnesia in this case.  (Supp. Tr., p.54, L.1.)
13.  It is very convenient for the defendant, when he is put to questions, to forget details.
Now,  yes,  this  might  be  a  traumatic  event,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  but  traumatic  events
make things memorable.  (Supp. Tr., p.55, Ls.22-25.)
14.  His feigned ignorance is not the product of a memory faulty of time; that is the
product of a fabrication, and answers he cannot fabricate quick enough to withstand the
scrutiny of questioning.  That tells you that he is not being truthful.  (Supp. Tr., p.56,
Ls.1-5.)
15.  But just because they scream out, “I’m sorry.  It’s an accident,” that doesn’t make it
true.  (Supp. Tr., p.57, L.25 – p.58, L.2.)
16.  His fabrications didn’t start with Detective Berger in an interview room; they started
as soon as the first-responders showed up.  He was fabricating and lying in his fit of
hysteria.  And given his capacity for deceit, you should give his hysteria little credence as
evidence of an accident.  (Supp. Tr., p.58, Ls.11-16.)
17.  Keep in mind, ladies and gentlemen, that in his fit of hysteria, he still maintained his
lie; and that was nothing more than the effects of methamphetamine.  (Supp. Tr., p.59,
Ls.10-14.)
18.  Physical evidence does not lie.  Physical evidence does not get high on meth.
Physical evidence does not tell inconsistent stories.  Physical evidence can’t be accused
of murder and therefore have a motive to lie.  (Supp. Tr., p.59, Ls.19-23.)
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19.   Physical  evidence  tells  the  truth,  and  the  truth  in  this  case  is  that  it  is  a  contact
gunshot wound to the head.  That is not an innocent act.  That is murder.  If you couple
the physical evidence with the defendant’s lies, deceit and omission, you arrive
inexorably at the conclusion that this was murder.  (Supp. Tr., p.59, L.24 – p.60, L.4.)
When given the opportunity to make rebuttal remarks, the prosecutor again focused on
calling Mr. Herrera a liar:
20.  . . . and the defendant’s lies are corroboration that he is guilty because innocent
people do not lie.  Guilty people lie because they have something to hide; the actions of
murder.  (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.10-13.)
21.   I’m  asking  you  to  infer  from  the  evidence,  the  guilty  conscience  and  lies  of  the
defendant, that he murdered her, because innocent people don’t lie; guilty people do.  If
this  was  an  accident,  he  would  not  have  feared  the  truth  and  he  would  have  told  what
happened.  (Supp. Tr., p.83, L.25 – p.84, L.4.)
The fact that Mr. Herrera was called a “liar” or his actions were characterized as “lies” or
fabrications over twenty different times during closing argument surely affected the jury's
deliberation of this case.
Although a prosecutor has considerable latitude in conducting closing arguments and can
argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence, a prosecutor should avoid expressing a
personal belief as to the credibility of the witnesses unless the comment is based solely on the
evidence. State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715 (Ct. App. 2003).  Here, Mr. Herrera did tell
seemingly inconsistent stories when interviewed by police and when he testified at the first trial;9
however, the prosecutor’s constant harping on the inconsistencies went far beyond a mere
comment on the evidence, and impermissibly strayed into misconduct.  Over twenty references
to Mr. Herrera as a liar or fabricator go beyond a comment on the evidence and constitute a
9 As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Herrera initially told law enforcement that when he
pulled back the slide to make sure the gun was unloaded, it went off (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. I),
p.224, Ls.18-22; Tr. (Vol. I), p.342, Ls.7-15); later he testified that he had threatened suicide and
his girlfriend pulled the gun toward her in an effort to get the gun away from him, and it went off
(2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. II), p.128, Ls.5-10).
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personal attack upon the defendant.  Such an attack would naturally lead the jury to believe there
is additional evidence not introduced at trial to which the prosecutor must be referencing.
Further,  assertions  similar  to  the  prosecutor's  statements  that  “only  the  guilty  lie”  have
been found to constitute misconduct in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Escobedo, 573
N.W.2d 271, 278 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (holding an “Innocent People Don’t Lie” overhead slide
ran “perilously close” to impermissible argument, and could have been impermissible under
different circumstances, but finding no error where slide was inadvertently exposed to the jury
without accompanying argument); State v. Herrarte, No. 6-774, 1997 WL 458710, at *4 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1997) (“Assuming arguendo the statement ‘Innocent People Don't Lie’
constitutes misconduct when conveyed by a prosecutor to the jury during closing
argument . . . .”).
Both  the  prosecutor  and  the  trial  judge  have  a  responsibility  to  ensure  that  closing
argument is kept within the proper bounds.  ABA Standard 3-5.8.10 State v. Pabst, 996 P.2d 321,
326  (Kan.  2000).   This  is  because  “the  ultimate  conclusion  as  to  any  witness’  veracity  rests
solely with the jury.” Pabst, 996 P.2d at 326 (relying on the ABA standards for prosecutors in
holding that prosecutor’s improper remarks during closing statements, including his accusing
10 The ABA standards for prosecutors say:
(a)  In  closing  argument  to  the  jury,  the  prosecutor  may  argue  all  reasonable
inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor should not intentionally
misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to
the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function, Standard 3-5.8
(3d ed. 1993).
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defendant of lying 11 times, coupled with timely objections overruled by trial court, denied
defendant a fair trial).
The commentary in American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice standard 3-
5.8 further explains the special concern with prosecutorial conduct:
The prosecutor’s argument is likely to have significant persuasive force with the
jury. Accordingly, the scope of argument must be consistent with the evidence
and marked by the fairness that should characterize all of the prosecutor’s
conduct. Prosecutorial conduct in argument is a matter of special concern because
of the possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor’s
arguments, not only because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor’s office
but also because of the fact-finding facilities presumably available to the office.
ABA Standard 3-5.8 cmt., p.107; see In re Glasmann, 286 P.3d 673, 679 (Wash. 2012) (holding
prosecutor's misconduct permeated the state's closing argument and could not have been cured
by an instruction, thus, new trial was necessary).
The Idaho Supreme Court recently censured similar prosecutorial name-calling in State v.
Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 399 P.3d 804 (2017).  In Lankford, the prosecutor called Mr. Lankford
a liar 16 times in its closing argument.  162 Idaho at __, 399 P.3d at 826-27.  While the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s remarks were not misconduct where Mr. Lankford had
admitted to the jury that he lied about the facts of the incident, the Idaho Supreme Court
admonished the State, writing that the prosecutor’s “repeated use of the term ‘liar’ and its various
grammatical forms [was] troubling and ill-advised”:
We are perplexed why the talented prosecutors of this State continue to choose to
use the word “liar” and risk appeal or reversal.  There are so many other powerful
verbal techniques that can be used to convey the same concept to jurors.
Id., at __, 399 P.3d at 827 & 828 n.7 (2017).
Here, the prosecutor’s insistence that Mr. Herrera lied about what happened prior to the
shooting, and even lied about his emotional reactions after the shooting, likely caused the jury to
question whether the prosecutor was relying on the evidence in the record.  After the
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prosecutor’s repeated insistence that defendant was a liar, it is likely that the jury would instead
assume the prosecutor is relying on facts not in evidence that the prosecutor had uncovered due
to the extra fact-finding facilities of his office.
2. The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct When The Prosecutor Misstated
The Evidence, The Law, And Its Burden Of Proof By Repeatedly Telling The
Jury  That  A  Contact  Gunshot  Wound  And/Or  The  Lies  Of  The  Defendant  Are
Sufficient To Convict Mr. Herrera Of Second Degree Murder
Closing  argument  serves  to  sharpen  and  clarify  the  issues  for  resolution  by  the  trier  of
fact in a criminal case.  Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86.  Its purpose is to enlighten the jury and to help
the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. Id; State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450
(Ct. App. 1991).  Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing
argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280
(2003).  However, a prosecutor may not misstate the law during closing arguments. Phillips, 144
Idaho at 86.
The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  explicitly  held  that  “the  Due  Process  Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970).  It is the State's burden to prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 363-64. If a jury disbelieves a testifying defendant's testimony, that is
insufficient to meet the State's burden. See id.; see also United States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d
1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding the correct standard for jury consideration of evidence in a
criminal case is “not which side is more believable, but whether, taking all of the evidence in the
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case into consideration, guilt as to every essential element of the charge has been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt”).
Mr. Herrera was charged with second degree murder under I.C. § 18-4001 and 18-
4003(g), which define second degree murder as “the unlawfully and with malice aforethought,
but without premeditation, killing of a human being, by willfully and deliberately pointing a .380
handgun at her head and pulling the trigger, from which she died.”  (Limited R., pp.117, 293.)
This offense requires the state to prove:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, the state
must prove each of the following:
1.  On or about December 25, 2011
2.  in the state of Idaho
3.  the defendant Joseph Duane Herrera engaged in conduct which caused the
death of Stefanie Comack,
4.  the defendant acted without justification or excuse, and
5. with malice aforethought which resulted in the death of Stefanie Comack.
 (Limited R., p.310.)
a. The Prosecutor Misstated The Law And Reduced The State’s Burden Of
Proof By Arguing That Mr. Herrera Did Not Provide Sufficient Evidence
Of His Innocence And By Telling The Jury That It Had Met Its Burden
Simply By Proving It Was A Contact Gun Shot Wound And/Or
Mr. Herrera Lied
In lieu of requiring the State to prove Mr. Herrera guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the
prosecutor instead argued that Mr. Herrera did not prove his innocence or provide evidence of
his innocence:
∑ This extreme emotional reaction is not the evidence of an innocent person
who committed a negligent act.  (Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.12-14.)
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∑ Do not let the Defendant’s meth usage be misconstrued as evidence of
innocence.  He was under the influence of meth and he was agitated.
(Supp. Tr. p.57, Ls.19-20.)
∑ Keep in mind, ladies and gentlemen, that in his fit of hysteria, he still
maintained his lie; and that was nothing more than the effects of
methamphetamine. Do not allow his usage of meth to be argued as
evidence of his innocence.  (Supp. Tr., p.59, Ls.10-14.)
∑ So his sleeping is a contradiction, his meth use, the threats of the family,
ladies and gentlemen, that provides no evidence to support his innocence.
(Supp. Tr., p.79, Ls.19-22.)
The prosecutor’s argument that Mr. Herrera had to provide evidence to support his innocence is
clearly wrong, and confused the jury as to what the State did have to prove.
During the prosecutor’s closing remarks, he further misstated the State’s burden of proof
by misstating the law—telling the jurors that because it was a contact gunshot wound, the State
has met its burden to show murder:
∑ A contact gun shot wound is not an accident.  A contact gunshot wound is not negligence.
A contact gunshot wound is not innocent.  A contact gunshot wound is murder.  (Supp.
Tr., p.44, Ls.10-14.)
∑ Stefanie’s last conscious moments on this earth were spent with a gun pressed against her
head, and that is murder.  (Supp. Tr., p.47, Ls.6-8.)
∑ Ladies and gentlemen, the physical evidence alone proves a murder, but there is more
than just physical evidence.  There is the guilty conscience and lies of the defendant.
(Supp. Tr., p.47, Ls.9-12.)
∑ Ladies and gentlemen, this case is simple.  The contact gunshot wound proves that this
was not an accident.  (Supp. Tr., p.83, Ls.20-22.)
∑ Once again, Stefanie can’t testify.  But as I said before, in death she’s able to tell us that
this was a murder because of the contact gunshot wound.  (Supp. Tr., p.90, Ls.8-11.)
The State also lessened its burden of proof by telling the jurors that a contact gunshot wound
+ a lying defendant = murder:
∑ Physical evidence tells the truth, and the truth in this case is that it is a contact gunshot
wound to the head.  That is not an innocent act.  That is murder.  If you couple the
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physical evidence with the defendant’s lies, deceit and omission, you arrive inexorably at
the conclusion that this was murder.  (Supp. Tr., p.59, L.24 – p.60, L.4.)
∑ That’s misdirection to try to misdirect you from the overwhelming strength of the
evidence of a contact gunshot wound. . . .The family showing up and being mean to the
defendant is no excuse for justification of murder.  It was meant to distract you from the
pertinent  facts  of  this  case;  the  contact  gunshot  wound  and  the  lies  of  the  defendant.11
(Supp. Tr., p.84, Ls.18-25.)
∑ Now,  as  I  said,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  the  contact  gunshot  wound,  plus  the  lies  of  the
defendant are sufficient to find second degree murder with express malice, but go ahead,
give him his best argument.  Pulling out a gun, high on meth, high on marijuana, during
an argument, with a gun you’ve never handled before, in close proximity with the person
you’re arguing with a mere feet away, holding it to your head, faking a suicide attempt, is
naturally dangerous to human life; and that is second degree murder.  This is not
negligence.  (Supp. Tr., p.87, Ls.11-21.)
∑ So, ladies and gentlemen, the physical evidence of a contact gunshot wound, and the
guilty  conscience  of  the  defendant  and  the  lying  is  enough  for  you  to  find  him  guilty.
(Supp. Tr., p.89, Ls.7-10.)
∑ And your reasoning and common sense should tell you that a contact wound to the head
with a defendant who lies equals murder by express malice.  (Supp. Tr., p.89, L.25 –
p.90, L.2.)
The prosecutor’s closing statements reduced the State’s burden of proof—essentially, the
prosecutor  told  the  jury  over  and  over  again  (ten  times)  that  if  it  proved  there  was  a  contact
gunshot wound and/or Mr. Herrera was a liar, it had proven Mr. Herrera guilty of second degree
murder.  However, the prosecutor’s directives to the jury eliminated one of the elements of
second degree murder—malice aforethought—and ignored the defense’s theory that the shooting
was an accident or mistake (Jury Instruction Nos. 12, 19), thereby reducing the State’s burden.
11 This statement also misstates the defense’s theory of the case.  The defense never claimed that
the homicide was “justified” because Ms. Comack’s family was mean to Mr. Herrera.  The
defense consistently maintained that Mr. Herrera did not know the gun still had a bullet in the
chamber and that the shooting was accidental.  (Supp. Tr., p.73, Ls.13-25.)  The jury instruction
requested by the defense, No. 12, was an instruction telling the jury that Mr. Herrera was not
capable of committing the crime if the shooting was the result of accident or misfortune when it
appeared there was not evil design, intention or culpable negligence.  (Limited R., pp.138, 305;
Supp. Tr., p.73, Ls.22-25.)
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Furthermore, even if the jury thought Mr. Herrera had been untruthful about the events leading
up to the accident, that was not enough to convict him of second degree murder. See Stanfield,
521 F.2d at 1125.
The jury had to conclude that the State’s evidence proved Mr. Herrera guilty of second
degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.  For the prosecutor to inform the jurors that, if they
believed the defendant had lied, he was guilty of murder, is a misstatement of the law.
The State went even further to simplify its burden of proof by telling the jurors that only
guilty people lie:
∑ The defendant’s lies are corroboration that he is guilty because innocent people do not
lie.  Guilty people lie because they have something to hide; the actions of murder.  (Supp.
Tr., p.81, Ls.10-13.)
∑ Ladies and gentlemen, the physical evidence alone proves a murder, but there is more
than just physical evidence.  There is the guilty conscience and lies of the defendant.
(Supp. Tr., p.47, Ls.9-12.)
∑ He is not telling the truth.  Innocent people do not lie.  Guilty people lie.  (Supp. Tr. p.49,
Ls.15-16.)
∑ I’m asking you to infer from the evidence, the guilty conscience and lies of the defendant,
that he murdered her, because innocent people don’t lie; guilty people do.  If this was an
accident, he would not have feared the truth and he would have told what happened.
(Supp. Tr., p.83, L.25 – p.84, L.4.)
The jury could have found, based on the physical evidence, that Mr. Herrera was guilty.
However, the jury also might have decided Mr. Herrera was guilty because the prosecutor made
it easy for them by telling them that Mr. Herrera had lied, and, because he lied, he was guilty of
murder.  It was misconduct to tell the jurors that Mr. Herrera was guilty of murder because his
version(s) of how the accident occurred were unclear.
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Further, the prosecutor made comments that were calculated to encourage the jury to
reach a guilty verdict based on an improper inference of guilt, and a reduced burden of proof,
where the prosecutor told the jury during closing statements:
And, ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you that even if you believe a firearm is
empty, putting it to somebody’s head with such pressure that it causes a contact
gunshot wound,12 even if you believe that weapon is empty, and you pull the
trigger, believing it to be empty, that’s still second degree murder, implied malice;
because once again, ladies and gentlemen, you never point a gun at anyone, never
point a gun at anything you don’t intend to kill.13
Even if you think the round is empty, putting a gun to somebody’s head is an
intentional act.  Even if you think it’s empty, that is dangerous because you could
be wrong.  And pulling the trigger, even thinking the gun to be empty, you could
still  be  wrong.   That  natural  consequence  is  very  dangerous  to  human life.   So,
ladies and gentlemen, even in the defendant’s best case, he still guilty of murder
in the second degree.
(Supp. Tr., p.88, Ls.4-20.)  It is not inherently dangerous to put an unloaded gun to a person’s
head.  In a situation where the person holding the gun has not checked to see if the gun is loaded,
12 The prosecutor’s claim that pressure was required to cause a contact gunshot wound was
unsupported by the evidence.  (See, e.g., Tr. (Vol. II), p.820, L.19 – p.872, L.24.)
13 The  prosecutor’s  argument  is  a  gun  safety  argument,  but  it  was  stated  as  if  it  were  the  law.
While it is certainly true that it is not prudent to put a gun you know is unloaded up to someone’s
head, doing so is not second degree murder, or even implied malice.  Additionally, in a situation
where a movie actor fires a loaded weapon she believes contains only blanks and then kills
someone,  according  to  the  State’s  logic,  she  is  guilty  of  second  degree  murder.   Such  an
argument ignores the lack of “malice aforethought” which is an essential element of second
degree murder, and negates Jury Instruction No. 12 which provided: “All persons are capable of
committing crimes, except those who committed the act or made the omission charged through
misfortune or by accident when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable
negligence.”  (Limited R., p.305.)  And Jury Instruction No. 19 provided, in relevant part:
For the defendant to be guilty of murder in the second degree, the state must
prove the defendant had a particular intent.  Evidence was offered that at the time
of the alleged offense the defendant was ignorant of or mistakenly believed
certain facts.  You should consider such evidence in determining whether the
defendant was ignorant of or mistakenly believed certain facts. . . .
(Limited R., p.312.)
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or where persons are playing “Russian Roulette” and there is a bullet in the gun, that natural
consequence could be very dangerous to human life.  But the “natural consequence” of an
unloaded gun is not “inherently dangerous” in and of itself.  While it would certainly scare a
person at whom the gun is being pointed if that person did not know the gun is not loaded; the
act itself is not inherently dangerous.
These statements to the jury reduced the State’s burden of proof in that the State was no
longer required to prove an essential element of second degree murder, “malice aforethought”;
instead, the State told the jury that the very act of putting a gun to someone’s head mandated a
finding of murder.
b. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Misstating The Evidence
Presented At Trial And Arguing Facts Not In Evidence
The prosecutor misstated the trial evidence and argued facts not in evidence to the jury
during his closing statements.  The prosecutor claimed both that it was the methamphetamine
that had caused Mr. Herrera to be so extremely upset after the shooting, and that Mr. Herrera was
faking his reaction in an attempt to show “evidence of his innocence.”  (Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.12-
21, p.58, Ls.11-16, p.59, Ls.10-14.)  The prosecutor also implied that there was “chaos” in the
bedroom after the shooting, which caused a critical piece of evidence—the magazine ejected
from the pistol—to be kicked around.  However, these arguments constituted misconduct as they
were not only unsupported by the evidence, but they were actually contrary to the evidence
adduced at trial.
It is a long-standing rule that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause prevents
state governments from obtaining convictions based on a prosecutor’s knowing use of false
evidence. Miller  v.  Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).  This goes not only to wholly fabricated
evidence, such as was the case in Pate, but also to arguments which misstate the evidence
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adduced at trial.  Thus, in United States v. Fearns, the Seventh Circuit ordered that the defendant
be retried where the prosecutor had tried to bolster the credibility of one of the government’s
witnesses by telling the jury that that witness had made a prior consistent statement, but where
no evidence had ever been offered as to that alleged prior consistent statement. United States v.
Fearns, 501 F.2d 486, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Tucker, 714 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2013).  The Seventh Circuit expressed outrage that the
prosecutor had attempted such a tactic, describing his deliberate violation of a “fundamental rule,
known to every lawyer,” as “gross misconduct.” Id.  at  489.   Therefore,  a  prosecutor  cannot
misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence during his closing arguments. Phillips, 144 Idaho
at 86.  Additionally, closing argument should not refer to facts not in evidence. Id.; State v.
Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565-66 (Ct. App. 2001).
For example, the Idaho Supreme Court found misconduct when a prosecutor
mischaracterized the facts even though the prosecutor’s statements “might constitute
prosecutorial license, if based on some peripheral view of the facts . . . .” State v. Griffiths, 101
Idaho 163, 166 (1980), abrogated on related grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396
(1981) (rejecting Griffiths’ application of the harmless error test).  Despite the fact that the
prosecutor may have drawn a logical inference, the Griffiths Court held:
[T]he statements were improper in the case at bar [because they] were
unsubstantiated by the record.  While our system of criminal justice is adversary
in nature and the prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone
unturned, he is nevertheless expected and required to be fair and has a duty to
avoid misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.
Id.
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i. The Prosecutor Misrepresented The Facts By Telling The Jurors
That The Methamphetamine Caused Mr. Herrera’s Agitation,
When The Testimony Had Been That Methamphetamine
Amplified Mr. Herrera’s Underlying Emotions
The prosecution’s closing remarks contained blatant misstatements of the evidence where
the testimony at trial had been that, when Mr. Herrera was under the influence of
methamphetamine, it amplified his underlying emotional state.  (See Supp. Tr., p.57, Ls.12-21.)
Daniel Ducommun, Mr. Herrera’s friend since childhood, testified that he had observed
Mr. Herrera under the influence of methamphetamine on multiple occasions.  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.928, L.23 – p.929, L.2; p.935, Ls.11-15.)  He said that methamphetamine amplified
Mr.  Herrera’s  existing  emotional  state.   (Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.935,  Ls.16-19.)   However,  he  testified
that he had never seen Mr. Herrera act the way he was acting right after the accident.   (Tr. (Vol.
II), p.935, L.24 – p.936, L.3.)
Yet the prosecutor instead characterized Mr. Herrera’s extreme distress and hysteria after
the shooting as a lie:
∑ His extreme emotional reaction is not the evidence of an innocent person who committed
a negligent act. Those are the actions and behaviors of a person under the influence of
methamphetamine.  The defendant’s own witness, his own friend of many years, testified
that  when  the  defendant  is  under  the  influence  of  meth,  it  amplifies  his  underlying
emotional state.  Do not let the Defendant’s meth usage be misconstrued as evidence of
innocence.  He was under the influence of meth and he was agitated.  (Supp. Tr., p.57,
Ls.12-21.)
∑ His fabrications didn’t start with Detective Berger in an interview room; they started as
soon as the first-responders showed up.  He was fabricating and lying in his fit of
hysteria.  And given his capacity for deceit, you should give his hysteria little credence as
evidence of an accident.  (Supp. Tr., p.58, Ls.11-16.)
∑ Keep in mind, ladies and gentlemen, that in his fit of hysteria, he still maintained his lie;
and that was nothing more than the effects of methamphetamine. Do not allow his usage
of meth to be argued as evidence of his innocence.   (Supp. Tr., p.59, Ls.10-14.)
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While the evidence supported the prosecutor’s conclusion that Mr. Herrera had told
differing versions of what happened in the room when his girlfriend was shot, there was no basis
for the prosecutor to harangue the jury with a misrepresentation of the facts in evidence.
Essentially, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Herrera was lying about what happened when the
accident occurred, and then faked his hysteria and distress after the shooting.  Such an
implication was not based on any facts or evidence adduced at trial and was not even necessary
for the prosecutor to prove his case.  Further, the prosecutor’s statements to the jury that it was
not an accident—that Mr. Herrera intentionally shot  his  girlfriend—was  certainly  contrary  to
what  the  State  had  previously  argued  in  the  first  trial.   The  final  words  in  the  State’s  rebuttal
closing in the first trial were, “He pulled that gun out, he put it to her head. He thought he took
the bullets out.  He pulled the trigger and the bullet came out.  That’s murder in the second
degree.”  (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. III), p.97, Ls.15-19 (emphasis added).)
ii. The Prosecutor Argued Facts Not In Evidence By Telling The
Jurors That The Chaos In The Bedroom Accounted For The Blood
On The Magazine Found By The Bed
The prosecutor argued facts not in evidence during closing argument when the prosecutor
falsely  alluded  to  the  jury  that  there  was  a  lot  of  chaos  in  the  bedroom,  “people  kicking  stuff
around,” and pointed out that there were two magazines recovered:  “[defense counsel] claims
that the defendant felt the firearm was empty, the magazine was out.  Perhaps it was popped out
after there was blood on the floor, after the EMT’s, people kicking stuff around.  You don’t
know when that magazine was kicked out.  There were two magazines for that when recovered.”
(Supp. Tr., p.87, L.22 – p.88, L.3.)   However, the prosecutor’s comments were speculative as no
evidence of this had been adduced at trial.
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Sheriff Bob Loe testified he was the first responder to the scene, and he walked in and
saw both Jerilyn Herrera and a neighbor helping the injured woman.  (See Tr. (Vol. I), p.336,
L.11 – p.337, L.5.)  He saw a magazine lying by the injured woman’s feet.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.337,
Ls.7-14; p.352, Ls.2-11.)  Ronnie Dickerson, the lead EMT going into the room, testified that the
EMTs were in the room for five minutes or less before they took the injured woman out to the
ambulance.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.325, Ls.2-11, p.326, Ls.6-10.)  Sheriff Loe recalled that he was at the
scene at 11:43 a.m. and the ambulance arrived at 11:51 a.m.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.363, Ls.1-16.)
Sheriff Loe testified that after the EMTs left, he and Detective Scott Castles guarded the
downstairs to make sure nobody went up to the scene upstairs, before going upstairs to check the
room.  (Tr. (Vol. I), p.345, Ls.3-24.)  Approximately one hour after the ambulance left, Officer
Castles picked up the .380 magazine that had been by the injured woman’s feet.  (Tr. (Vol. I),
p.345, L.23 - p.346, L.1, p.348, Ls.7-15, p.360, Ls.13-20; Tr. (Vol. II), p.420, L.21 – p.423,
L.18;  Plaintiff’s  Exhibit  No.  7,  8;  Defendant’s  Exhibit  C.)   He  testified  that  he  took  four
photographs in and around the bedroom.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.426, L.2 – p.427, L.19; Plaintiff’s Exs.
5, 6, 7, 8.)  In the photographs, the magazine is where Sheriff Loe testified that he first saw it—
right  in  front  of  the  nightstand,  near  where  the  injured  woman’s  feet  were.   (See Tr. (Vol. I),
p.337, Ls.11-14, p.345, L.19 – p.346, L.1, p.352, Ls.2-11; Tr. (Vol. II), p.421, Ls.9-24;
Plaintiff’s Exs. 1 (11:38-40), 7, 8.)  Deputy Richardson’s bodycam video depicts a relatively
calm and efficient scene in the bedroom, with a couple of EMTs working on the injured woman
with sufficient space to do their work.14  (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1.)  Thus, the prosecutor’s speculation
14 Mr. Herrera’s mother did testify that she moved two items of furniture—the bed and the
rocking chair—so that the emergency medical personnel could have easier access.  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.441, L.20 – p.443, L.11.)
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that there was “chaos” in the bedroom was contrary to the trial testimony of Sheriff Loe, Officer
Castles, and the State’s trial evidence.
While the State did not attempt to elicit any information from its witnesses relating to a
chaotic scene in the bedroom or that things in there were “kicked around” there, the prosecutor
felt free to imply such to the jury in order to discredit the defense’s theory of an accidental
shooting:
Mr. Andersen claims that the defendant felt the firearm was empty, the magazine was
out. . . .  Perhaps it was popped out after there was blood on the floor, after the EMT’s,
people kicking stuff around.  You don’t know when that magazine was kicked out.
(Supp. Tr., p.87, L.22 – p.88, L.2.)15  At best the prosecutor’s theory was a wild guess; however,
it was a guess unsupported by the trial evidence.  The prosecutor commented, “There were two
magazines for that when recovered” which appeared to be an attempt to mislead the jury.  (Supp.
Tr., p.88, Ls.2-3)  While there were actually three magazines that were recovered from the
room—two of the three magazines were found in a nightstand drawer.  (See Tr. (Vol. I), p.348,
Ls.16-25.)  The comment, when put in context, would reasonably be interpreted such that he was
trying to lead the jury to believe that there were multiple magazines found on the floor, and that,
due to the “chaos,” it wouldn’t be possible to know whether the magazine with blood on it was
the one that had been in the gun.  (Supp. Tr., p.87, L.22 – p.88, L.3.)  This apparently is an
attempt to discredit the defense’s theory—Mr. Herrera had maintained that he ejected the clip
onto the floor before the accident occurred, and that the clip found on the floor had blood on top
15 The prosecutor did question several of the State’s witnesses about the chaos at the house when
members of the Comack family arrived.  (See Tr. (Vol. I), p.357, Ls.2-19, p.378, L.25 – p.379,
L.10.) Further, on cross-examination, defense counsel asked Deputy Richardson, “Would it be
fair to say that upon your arrival and events that transpired it was pretty chaotic?” to which he
answered, “From my role in the event, um – I would say most events like this are chaotic.  I did
what I’m trained to do.”  (Trial Tr. (Vol. I), p.388, Ls.1-5.)
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of it, which would tend to support the defense’s theory that the clip was ejected before the shot
was fired.  The testimony was clear—there was only one magazine found on the floor with blood
on it. (Tr. (Vol. I), p.345, L.19 – p.346, L.1, p.348, Ls.18-25; Tr. (Vol. II), p.766, L.18 – p.767,
L.2), thus the prosecutor’s statements were misleading—asking the jury to assume that there was
chaos and several clips on the floor being kicked around, when this was clearly contrary to the
evidence.
In this case, the prosecutor’s suggestion that there was chaos in the bedroom and the
magazine was probably kicked around during the commotion might be viewed as a permissible
inference based on a peripheral view of the facts; however, as in Griffiths, there were no facts
offered into evidence that actually substantiated the prosecutor’s speculations.  Therefore, as in
Griffiths, the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly drawing inferences about facts
that were not in evidence.
As such, the prosecutor improperly misrepresented the evidence before the jury during
closing arguments. The prosecutor’s misrepresented the evidence and his comments were
calculated to encourage the jury to reach a guilty verdict based on facts which were not in
evidence. These comments violated Mr. Herrera’s rights to a fair trial and due process under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
3.  The Prosecutor’s Misconduct Constitutes Fundamental Error Requiring This
Court To Vacate Mr. Herrera’s Conviction
       Mr. Herrera did not object to the prosecutor’s improper arguments; however, he asserts
that the prosecutor’s argument amounts to fundamental error necessitating this Court to vacate
his conviction. “Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate
courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in question
qualifies as fundamental error[.]” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. “Such review includes a three-prong
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inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” Id. at 228.
a. By Arguing That The Jurors Could Find Mr. Herrera Guilty Of Second
Degree Murder Because He Lied, The Prosecutor Misstated The Law And
Attempted  To  Secure  A  Guilty  Verdict  By  Improper  Means,  Thus
Violating Mr. Herrera’s Fourteenth Amendment Right To A Fair Trial
      The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  explicitly  held  that  “the  Due  Process  Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in
the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a
fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
“[P]rosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments will constitute fundamental error
only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not
have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should
be disregarded.” Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Cortez, 135
Idaho 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001)); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 (2014) (holding that
prosecutorial misconduct was not fundamental error where improper statements about
nightmares or child suffering were not made or dwelled upon in support of a harsher punishment
and  did  not  misrepresent  the  evidence  that  was  presented  to  the  jury.)   “It  follows  that  a
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misstatement to a jury of the State's burden rises to the level of fundamental error because it goes
to  the  foundation  of  the  case  and  would  take  away from a  defendant  a  right  essential  to  his  or
her defense.” State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding the prosecutor's
distortion of the State's burden of proof in closing argument was fundamental error and highly
prejudicial).
In order to find Mr. Herrera guilty of second degree murder, the jury had to find the State
proved that Mr. Herrera engaged in conduct which caused the death of Stefanie Comack,
Mr. Herrera acted without justification or excuse, and with malice aforethought.  (Limited
R., p.310.)  By misrepresenting the evidence and misstating the burden of proof, including telling
the jury that a contact gunshot wound and/or a lying defendant means murder, the prosecution
deprived Mr. Herrera of a right essential to his defense which goes to the foundation of the case.
This was fundamental error. See Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685.
Further, by repeatedly calling Mr. Herrera a liar and claiming that he was fabricating
what occurred and even his reaction to it, the State undercut Mr. Herrera’s credibility and the
defense’s theory of the case.  Where Mr. Herrera maintained the shooting was an accident—that
he ejected the magazine and pulled back the slide to eject the bullet—but the prosecutor
repeatedly challenged Mr. Herrera’s veracity, it is likely the jury believed, at the prosecutor’s
insistence, that Mr. Herrera was a liar.
The prosecutor’s misconduct violated Mr. Herrera’s due process right to a fair trial.
b.  The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face
      The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to
believe that Mr. Herrera’s counsel was “sandbagging” the district court by failing to object to the
prosecutor misstating the evidence, the law and its burden of proof, falsely telling the jurors that
61
a contact gunshot wound and/or a lying defendant is murder, and by repeatedly calling
Mr.  Herrera  a  liar.    The  elements  the  State  must  prove  in  order  for  the  jury  to  convict  a
defendant of second degree murder are well-established.  See State v. Porter, 142 Idaho 371,
373-75 (2005). There is simply no strategic advantage that can possibly be gained by failing to
object to, and to ask the court to correct, the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law or its burden of
proof.    Nor is there any advantage in allowing the prosecutor to repeatedly assail the
defendant’s credibility where the jury, in order to find the defendant not guilty or guilty of a
lesser offense, must believe the defendant’s account that the shooting was an accident.
Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face.
c. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless
       Because Mr. Herrera did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during trial, he bears
“the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.  Mr. Herrera asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that the
prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of his trial.
      The magazine was photographed with blood on it.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.766, L.18 – p.767,
L.2; Plaintiff’s Exs. 8, 45; Def’s Ex. C.)  It was photographed next to the side of the bed, some
distance (roughly 5 feet) away from the large blood stain, next to a lighter and a hair clip.
(Plaintiff’s Exs. 7 & 8.)  Mr. Herrera had consistently maintained that he ejected the clip from
the gun and pulled back the slide to eject the bullet in the chamber just before the accident.
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.500, Ls.10-14, p.562, Ls.22-25, p.564, L.1 – p.566, L.9, p.632, Ls.4-7.)
Mr. Herrera was unfamiliar with the gun, and had only recently taken it from his father’s dresser.
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.604, L.20 – p.605, L.11, p.608, L.16 – p.609, L.8.)  He had never fired it.
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.636, Ls.13-14.)  Detective Berger testified that, in his experience, these types of
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pistols are unloaded when the slide is pulled back—the round in the chamber automatically
ejects.   (Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.566,  Ls.5-9.)   However,  this  gun  was  tested,  and  the  State’s  witness,
Stuart  Jacobson,  testified  that  the  gun  malfunctioned.   (Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.916,  Ls.13-16.)   When
tested, in five of fifty attempts, the gun failed to eject the bullet in the chambers when the slide
was pulled back.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.916, Ls.17-22.)  In fact, during the first trial the prosecutor
conceded that Mr. Herrera believed the gun was unloaded.  (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. III), p.97,
Ls.15-19 (the State arguing in its rebuttal closing: “He pulled that gun out, he put it to her head.
He thought he took the bullets out.  He pulled the trigger and the bullet came out.  That’s murder
in the second degree.”).)  It was only during the second trial that the prosecutor argued to the jury
that Mr. Herrera knew the gun was loaded, thus, he was feigning his extreme distress and
hysteria when his girlfriend was shot.  (See Supp. Tr., p.58, Ls.11-16.)
Whether Mr. Herrera’s actions were accidental or whether he had malice aforethought
was  the  central  issue  for  the  jury  to  decide.   It  is  quite  possible  that  the  jurors  believed  that
Mr. Herrera did not show “evidence of his innocence” or that his lies meant he was guilty.  It is
also quite possible that the jurors believed the prosecutor’s argument that a contact gunshot
wound, by itself, means murder.   In sum, there is a reasonable possibility that the jurors applied
the wrong burden of proof in determining whether the shooting was an accident or whether
Mr. Herrera acted with malice aforethought, and a reasonable possibility that, had they required
the State to carry its burden to prove second degree murder, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.  Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was not harmless.
Although in Parker, the Court ultimately found the prosecutor’s references to nightmares
and  child  suffering  did  not  rise  to  the  level  of  fundamental  error  based  on  the  test  set  forth  in
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445 (2012), the facts of Mr. Herrera’s case meet the Adamcik test.
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In Adamcik, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by appealing to the
jury's sympathy for the victim and the victim’s family. 152 Idaho at 480–81. The Adamcik Court
held that the prosecutor’s statements were arguably improper, but did not constitute fundamental
error for three reasons:
(1) the statements were not dwelled upon or made in support of an argument that
the defendant receive a harsher sentence;
(2) the statements merely reiterated evidence offered previously during the trial;
and
(3) the district court had instructed the jury on several occasions that the
prosecutor’s closing statements were not to be regarded as evidence.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 481.  Therefore, the court held that the defendant had not shown a
reasonable possibility the verdict would have differed had the error not occurred. Id.
Here, the prosecutor’s comments did misstate the trial evidence and the State’s burden of
proof, and the prosecutor did dwell upon these misstatements of its burden in order to ask the
jury to convict Mr. Herrera of a harsher punishment—a murder conviction, as opposed to a
manslaughter conviction.
The Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Herrera his right to a fair trial
because it cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that misconduct did not contribute to the
verdict. In reviewing the trial as a whole, the prosecutor’s improper comments, constituting
misconduct, likely influenced the jury.
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V.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Herrera’s Fourteenth
Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors
Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Herrera asserts that even if the Court finds that the above preserved errors were
individually harmless, the district court’s errors combined amount to cumulative error.  “The
cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself
might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the
defendant’s constitutional right to due process.” State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App.
2002).  In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to
more than one of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied
the defendant a fair trial. State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999).  Under that
doctrine, even when individual errors are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may
deprive a defendant of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994).  However, a
finding of cumulative error must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v.
Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Herrera asserts that the district court’s preserved errors amounted to actual errors
depriving him of a fair trial.  His arguments in support of this assertion are found in sections I.C.,
II.C., and III.C. above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by reference.
VI.
The District Court Imposed A Vindictive Sentence After The Second Trial
A. Introduction
Mr. Herrera asserts the district court imposed a vindictive sentence after the second trial.
After Mr. Herrera’s first trial, the district court imposed a unified sentence of life imprisonment,
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with twenty-two years fixed.  (2013 Trial Tr. (Vol. I), p.389, L.24 – p.390, L.1.)  However, after
Mr. Herrera’s second trial, the second sentencing judge, Judge Mitchell, imposed a unified
sentence of life imprisonment, with thirty years fixed.  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.1019, L.25 – p.1020,
L.3.)  While Mr. Herrera did not raise a vindictive sentence objection before the district court, he
asserts the record shows fundamental error.
At  the  sentencing  hearing  following  Mr.  Herrera’s  second trial,  the  district  court  stated
the jury from the first trial had found the elements were proven, “but may have done so based on
improper evidence.  We’ll never know.”  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.1008, L.19 – p.1009, L.3.)
Judge Mitchell stated that, in contrast, “[t]he second jury unanimously found all the facts were
proven, and that was without any improper evidence being presented to them.”  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.1009, Ls.4-7.)
The district court then stated that in the first trial’s opening argument, Mr. Herrera’s
counsel at the time “claimed this was an accident.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1009, Ls.15-18.)  The district
court also stated Mr. Herrera’s counsel from the second trial “argued to the second jury that this
was an accident, and there’s been claims made at various points in times that this was reckless
conduct which is a step above accident as far as culpability goes.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1009, Ls.19-
23.)   According  to  the  district  court,  while  those  were  strategy  decisions  by  Mr.  Herrera’s
counsel,  “I  am  left  today  with  a  person  that  still  hasn’t  come  forward  with  what  actually
happened.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1009, L.23 – p.1010, L.1.)
Judge Mitchell stated, “[t]he difficulty here in this case is that no one in this courtroom
right now has closure, and a part of that is due to what happened in the first trial because of an
attorney’s decision and that’s hugely unfortunate.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1010, Ls.7-11.)  The district
court, after explaining that nobody knew what happened, stated, “I’m going to talk about what I
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do know.  And not making that statement today is not only affecting their lack of closure, but it’s
your showing a lack of responsibility, accountability.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1010, L.11 – p.1011,
L.4.)
Additionally, the district court stated the incident “was an intentional act every step of the
way.”   (Tr.  (Vol.  II),  p.1011,  Ls.5-6.)   The  district  court  discussed  whether  there  had  been  an
argument before the shooting, and evidence that Mr. Herrera was controlling.  (See Tr. (Vol. II),
p.1012, p.7 – p.1014, L.25.)  But the district court later returned to how Mr. Herrera had not
“come forward with which of the stories is right, true, the truth, if any of them.”  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.1015, Ls.20-23.)
After going through the Toohill factors,16 the district court explained why it was imposing
a fixed sentence of thirty years, rather than a fixed sentence of life as the State had
recommended.  (See Tr. (Vol. II), p.1017, L.11 – p.1022, L.4.)  The district court stated it had
given some weight to the first sentencing judge’s sentence of twenty-two years fixed.  (Tr. (Vol.
II), p.1021, L.22 – p.1022, L.4.)  Judge Mitchell then stated, “[t]he greatest thing that impacts my
decision compared to [the first sentencing judge’s] decision is a couple more years have ticked
on and we still don’t know what happened the morning of December 25th, 2011, and that’s the
way it will remain forever.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1022, L.25 – p.1023, L.4.)  The district court
expressed the hope that everyone in the courtroom would start to heal, stating “the fact that this
had to be retried by its very nature keeps the wound open, and that’s sad.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1023,
Ls.7-12.)   Mr.  Herrera  asserts  that  the  district  court,  by  imposing  a  sentence  with  a  fixed  term
eight years longer than the fixed term imposed by the first sentencing judge, imposed a
vindictive sentence.
16 See State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565 (Ct. App. 1982).
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B. Standard Of Review
Although there was no vindictive sentence objection made before the district court (see
Tr. (Vol. II), p.1024, Ls.14-20), this Court may review this issue for fundamental error. See
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010); State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 529-30 (1993).
Under fundamental error review, the defendant must show the alleged error:  (1) violates one or
more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) is not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho
at 228.
C. The District Court, By Imposing A Vindictive Sentence, Violated Mr. Herrera’s
Unwaived Constitutional Right To Due Process
Mr. Herrera asserts he has met the first prong of fundamental error review, because the
district court, by imposing a vindictive sentence, violated his unwaived right to due process. See
State v. Baker, 153 Idaho 692, 695 (Ct. App. 2012).  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides no State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.  The United States Supreme Court
has held that due process of law “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having
successfully  attacked  his  first  conviction  must  play  no  part  in  the  sentence  he  receives  after  a
new trial.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
The Pearce Court observed that “it would be a flagrant violation [of the Due Process
Clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state trial court to follow an announced practice of
imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of
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punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside.”
Id. at 723-24.  The Court held that, to assure the absence of a retaliatory motivation on the part of
the sentencing judge, “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after
a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear.” Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725-26.
Later, the United States Supreme Court explained the Pearce Court had “applied a
presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the
record justifying the increased sentence.” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982).
However, the United States Supreme Court has since limited the ambit of the Pearce
presumption of vindictiveness.
For example, in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), the United States Supreme Court
held the application of the Pearce presumption is limited to circumstances in which there is a
reasonable likelihood that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the
part of the sentencing authority. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799.  The Alabama v. Smith
Court also held that “[w]here there is no such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the
defendant to prove actual vindictiveness.” Id.
In Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held the
Pearce presumption “is also inapplicable because different sentencers assessed the varying
sentences that McCullough received.” McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140.  In McCullough, a jury
sentenced the defendant, and after a new trial, the trial judge imposed a greater sentence. Id. at
135-36.  The Court in McCullough held that “the second sentencer provides an on-the-record,
wholly logical, nonvindictive reason for the sentence.  We read Pearce to require no more
particularly since trial judges must be accorded broad discretion in sentencing.” Id. at 140.
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Idaho’s appellate courts, based on McCullough, have held the Pearce presumption of
vindictiveness does not apply where a different judge sentenced a defendant. See State v.
Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 532 (1993); State v. Colwell, 127 Idaho 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1995).
Some courts in other jurisdictions have also read McCullough as meaning the Pearce
presumption does not extend to sentences handed down by a different judge after appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. Miller, 822 N.W.2d 360,
365 (Neb. 2012).
Conceding the Pearce presumption does not clearly apply and Mr. Herrera must show
actual vindictiveness, the record here shows actual vindictiveness.  The Idaho Court of Appeals
has held, “[w]e look to the totality of the circumstances when reviewing a record for whether a
sentence was imposed vindictively.” Baker, 153 Idaho at 695 (citing State v. Brown, 131 Idaho
61, 72 (Ct. App. 1998)).  The scope of review under the totality of the circumstances is narrowly
defined, because the question of vindictiveness “focuses upon the sentencing judge’s view of the
defendant’s decision to plead not guilty.  That view cannot be determined upon a single remark
removed from context.  The judge’s words and actions must be considered as a whole.” Id.
(quoting State v. Regester, 106 Idaho 296, 300 (Ct. App. 1984)).
Here, the totality of the circumstances shows the district court imposed Mr. Herrera’s
sentence with actual vindictiveness.  The district court, while it also referred to the Toohill
factors and other appropriate sentencing considerations, kept returning to what it perceived as a
lack of closure.  (See, e.g., Tr. (Vol. II), p.1010, L.7 – p.1011, L.6, p.1015, Ls.20-23.)  In fact, as
discussed above, Judge Mitchell observed, “[t]he greatest thing that impacts my decision
compared to [the first sentencing judge’s] decision is a couple more years have ticked on and we
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still don’t know what happened the morning of December 25th, 2011, and that’s the way it will
remain forever.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1022, L.25 – p.1023, L.4.)
This lack of closure stemmed from Mr. Herrera exercising his right to appeal and the
resulting second trial.  The district court stated, “the fact that this had to be retried by its very
nature keeps the wound open, and that’s sad.”  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1023, Ls.7-12.)  Thus, the district
court increased Mr. Herrera’s sentence because he chose to exercise his right to appeal (and his
right to a jury trial after he won his appeal), and the sentence is actually vindictive.  A pair of
vindictive sentencing cases from other jurisdictions illustrates why.
In State v. Bradley, 383 P.3d 937 (Or. Ct. App. 2016), a case involving various sex
crimes, the defendant was convicted for nine counts against one victim, and for three counts
against a second victim. See Bradley, 383 P.3d at 938.  The defendant was originally sentenced
to a total of 215 months imprisonment, with concurrent prison terms of 34 months, 34 months,
and 115 months for the counts against the second victim. Id.  The defendant appealed, and the
Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the convictions with respect to the first victim
for evidentiary error, and affirmed the three convictions with respect to the second victim. Id.
The trial  court  in Bradley then held a resentencing hearing on the affirmed counts, and
imposed a total sentence of 183 months imprisonment, “68 months longer than the 115 months
that it had originally imposed for those counts when they ran concurrently.” Id. at 938-39.  The
trial court stated it was “entitled to consider—now this is interesting—the Court is entitled to
consider  the  sexual  abuse  of  the  child  whose  cases  were  reversed  and  remanded.” Id. at 939.
The trial court also stated, “[t]he reason why I say that is because those were reversed and
remanded, so he can stand trial for those again and when a Court sentences a defendant, the
Court often hears from victims of crimes who were never convicted or never prosecuted, but the
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Court can consider that other abuse.” Id.  The trial court further noted, “[t]he State might elect
not to prosecute him on the other child’s case.  They might consider this sentence sufficient.  But
it doesn’t mean I can’t also consider that in making my sentence.” Id.
On appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals held the trial court “imposed a sentence that
effectively punished defendant for his success on appeal.” Id. at 941.  The Bradley Court
observed the trial court’s conclusion that the State might not prosecute the defendant on the first
victim’s case was problematic, because “the state’s case against defendant on the reversed counts
would not be supported by [the erroneously-admitted] evidence if he were retried and, as noted,
the state dismissed the reversed counts once defendant had received an increased sentence on the
affirmed counts.” Id.
The Bradley Court concluded, “Defendant’s sentence should not have been increased
such that the prosecution would be relieved of its burden to prove the reversed counts beyond a
reasonable  doubt.   That  is  the  essence  of  punishing  defendant  for  his  success  on  appeal.” Id.
“To the extent that the court on resentencing after an appeal relies on an impermissible
consideration in increasing the sentence imposed on particular counts, the defendant establishes
that the sentence is vindictive.” Id.  Thus, the Bradley Court held, “[b]ecause the trial court
based its decision to increase the sentence for the affirmed counts on the reversed counts that
were still pending prosecution, the trial court exceeded the applicable limits under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus, defendant has affirmatively proved actual
vindictiveness.” Id.  The Bradley Court remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 942.
In State v. Hidalgo, 684 So.2d 26 (La. Ct. App. 1996), a possession with intent to
distribute marijuana case, the defendant initially had a sentence with thirty months of actual
incarceration. See Hidalgo, 684 So.2d at 28.  The defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
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guilty plea and a motion to reconsider his sentence. Id.  The district court denied the motion to
withdraw  the  guilty  plea. Id.  As  for  the  motion  to  reconsider  the  sentence,  the  district  court
amended the sentence to increase the actual incarceration time to thirty-six months. Id.  The
district court ruled as follows:
Well, I am going to reconsider his sentence.  I’ve thought about his case.  Instead
of taking his medicine, admitting his guilt, and accepting his sentence, he chose
instead  to  attack  his  plea  when  he  knew  it  was  free  and  voluntary.   And  in
thinking  about  it,  I  think  I  was  too  easy  on  him the  first  time around.   So  I  am
going to reconsider his sentence, and I am going to amend it by increasing his
hard labor time to 36 months rather than 30 months, which is in accordance with
the pre-sentence investigation.  And, except as so amended, the sentence will be
reaffirmed.
Id. at 31.
On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal held the district court “not only failed to prove
adequate justification on the record for its decision to increase the defendant’s sentence but also
apparently increased his sentence because he chose to exercise his right to attack his guilty plea.”
Id.  The Hidalgo Court also held, “[s]ince the increased sentence failed to satisfy the dictates of
due process as set forth in Pearce . . . such sentence must be vacated.” Id. at 31-32.  The Court
remanded the matter to the trial court “for resentencing consistent with the guidelines laid down
by the Supreme Court in Pearce.” Id. at 32.
The district court’s sentence here present several parallels with the actually vindictive
sentences in Bradley and Hidalgo.  By focusing on the lack of closure (see Tr. (Vol. II), p.1009,
L.23– p.1011, L.4, p.1015, Ls.20-23, p.1022, L.25 – p.1023, L.4), Judge Mitchell effectively
punished Mr. Herrera for his success on appeal. See Bradley, 383 P.3d at 941.  As in Bradley,
“[t]o the extent that the court on resentencing after an appeal relies on an impermissible
consideration in increasing the sentence imposed on particular counts, the defendant establishes
that the sentence is vindictive.” See id.
73
The  district  court  in Hidalgo increased the defendant’s sentence because, “[i]nstead of
taking his medicine, admitting his guilt, and accepting his sentence, he chose instead to attack his
plea when he knew it was free and voluntary.” See Hidalgo, 684 So.2d at 31.  Similarly, the
district court here increased Mr. Herrera’s sentence because, instead of “com[ing] forward with
which of the stories is right, true, the truth, if any of them,” (see Tr. (Vol. II), p.1015, Ls.20-23),
he exercised his right to appeal and, after winning on appeal, went to a second trial.
As Bradley and Hidalgo help illustrate, the district court increased Mr. Herrera’s sentence
because he chose to exercise his right to appeal.  Thus, the totality of the circumstances shows
Judge Mitchell imposed Mr. Herrera’s sentence with actual vindictiveness. See also State v.
Sutherburg, 402 A.2d 1294 (Me. 1979) (holding a defendant’s increased fine was patently
unconstitutional, because it was imposed to penalize the defendant for exercising his right to trial
by jury); State v. Morgan, 15 So.3d 1026, 1030-31 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]here was a complete
absence in the record of any relevant facts subsequent to defendant’s first sentencing to suggest a
harsher sentence”); People v. Cox, 122 A.D.2d 487, 488-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that,
because “the sole reason for greatly enlarging the sentence beyond the agreed upon time was
defendant’s exercise of his right to proceed to trial,” the increased sentence was impermissible).
By increasing Mr. Herrera’s sentence because he chose to exercise his right to appeal, the
district court imposed an actually vindictive sentence. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.  Thus, the
district court violated Mr. Herrera’s unwaived right to due process.  See Baker, 153 Idaho at 695.
Mr. Herrera has met the first prong of fundamental error review.
D. The Error In Imposing A Vindictive Sentence Plainly Exists
Mr. Herrera has also met the second prong of fundamental error review, namely, that the
error plainly exists. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.  At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Herrera
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requested the district court impose a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with ten years fixed.
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.1001, Ls.4-10.)  But the district court imposed a unified sentence of life
imprisonment, with thirty years fixed.  (Tr. (Vol. II), p.1019, L.25 – p.1020, L.3.)  Considering
the gulf between the sentence Mr. Herrera requested and the sentence the district court imposed,
it cannot be said that the failure to object to the actually vindictive sentence was a tactical or
strategic decision by Mr. Herrera’s counsel.  The district court’s error in imposing a vindictive
sentence plainly exists.
E. The Error In Imposing A Vindictive Sentence Was Not Harmless
Turning to the third prong of fundamental error review, Mr. Herrera has likewise shown
the  error  here  was  not  harmless.   Under  the  third  prong,  “the  defendant  bear[s]  the  burden  of
proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” Perry,
150 Idaho at 226.  In this case, the first sentencing judge imposed upon Mr. Herrera a unified
sentence of life imprisonment, with twenty-two years fixed.  (2013 Tr. (Vol. I), p.389, L.24 –
p.390,  L.1.)   After  Mr.  Herrera  won  his  appeal  and  went  through  the  second  trial,  the  district
court imposed a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with thirty years fixed.  (Tr. (Vol. II),
p.1019, L.25 – p.1020, L.3.)  Essentially, Judge Mitchell added eight years to the fixed term of
Mr. Herrera’s sentence for exercising his right to appeal.  Thus, Mr. Herrera has proven there is a
reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome of his case.  This error is not harmless. See
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.
The district court imposed a vindictive sentence after Mr. Herrera’s second trial.  By
imposing an actually vindictive sentence, the district court violated Mr. Herrera’s unwaived right
to due process.  This error in imposing a vindictive sentence plainly exists, and the error is not
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harmless.   Thus,  Mr.  Herrera  has  met  all  three  prongs  of  fundamental  error  review.
Mr. Herrera’s sentence should be vacated, and the case should be remanded for resentencing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Herrera respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.  Alternatively, he asks that this
Court vacate the judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing in
front of a different judge.
DATED this 13th day of October, 2017.
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